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SECULAR HERETIC AS VICTIM:
BURKEIAN EXAMINATION OF THE
SECURITY CLEARANCE HEARING
OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
Elizabeth A. Roberts
Ohio Northern University
On the twelfth day of April, 1954, at 10 a.m. in Building T-3, Room 2022
of the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington, D.C., Dr. Gordon Gray,
Chairman of the Personnel Security Board, formally read the following charge:
As a result of additional investigation as to your character, association, and
loyalty, and review of your personnel security file in the light of requirements
of the Atomic Energy Act and the requirements of Executive Order 10450
there has developed considerable question whether your continued em
ployment on Atomic Energy Commission work will endanger the common
defense and security and whether such continued employment is clearly
consistent with the interests of national security.^
Thus began a hearing of four weeks duration which examined the views,
associations, actions, and suspected disloyalty—literally, the life—of J. Robert
Oppenheimer: professor of physics; director of the Institute for Advanced
Study in Princeton; former director of the Atomic Weapons Laboratories at
Los Alamos, New Mexico; former chairman of the General Advisory Com
mittee of the Atomic Energy Commission; and advisor on atomic matters to
the State Department, the Defense Department and individual service de
partments of the government of the United States.
The charges brought against Oppenheimer and the means by which his
security clearance was removed provide an interesting study in rhetoric.
Furthermore, the theories of critic Kenneth Burke offer a means of exploring
the language of Oppenheimer's hearing and show why and how the gov
ernment condemned one of the best theoretical physicists of his generation.
The present climate of concern regarding nuclear arms, government inter
vention, and first amendment rights makes an examination of this case par
ticularly appropriate.
In his participation in formulating nuclear policy, Oppenheimer's per
spectives and his often abrasive personality conflicted with the views of
government officials who were enveloped by fear of Soviet nuclear supe
riority and who vehemently urged maximum speed development of Amer
ican military strength, especially nuclear. This confrontation became keenly
focused in 1949, following the Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic
device which had been produced far earlier than most U.S. scientists had
' United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer,
Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board and Texts of Principal Documents
and Letters (1954; rpt. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971). (Hereafter referred to as
Transcript.)
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-4 (1989), 1-8.
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expected. The United States, thus, needed to determine how aggressively
to pursue development of the immensely powerful hydrogen bomb. Op-
penheimer and the General Advisory Committee of the AEG desired to delay
any major progress on the H-bomb until a final attempt was made to agree
on a mutual foreswearing of the "super-bomb" with the Soviet Union. The
Committee's attempts were stifled when President Harry Truman decided
otherwise.
Even though Oppenheimer's consultant role with the government had
diminished significantly by 1953, he was, nevertheless, in a position to in
fluence national security policy by virtue of the prestige which surrounded
him. He had an almost unique knowledge of nuclear weapons, the effects
of those weapons, and of a nuclear arms race. He also possessed a highly
rational nature, an extreme distrust of secrecy, a suspicion of inherited as
sumptions, and an almost unbounded faith in the virtues of an open society
(Wilson xx). Replete with these characteristics, Oppenheimer struggled
to understand the impact of nuclear science upon the national security needs
of the United States. That struggle led him to speak openly about the facts
of the nuclear arms race; that struggle led him to criticize official military
strategy. Oppenheimer opted for a radical revision of the way men thought
about national security and international relations in the nuclear age, and
publicly debating the secret issues was part of that altered view. Oppen
heimer looked ahead and saw futility in the arcane calculus of the "strategic
nuclear balance." He understood the semantic force of the traditional doc
trine to "stay ahead."
However, in the 1950s, Oppenheimer was considered to be a critic, a
heretic, a prophet whose thoughts led a government of powerful and pur
poseful men to question his motivations. The result of that questioning was
a challenge to the veracity and character of j. Robert Oppenheimer—a
security clearance hearing. An analysis of that hearing as a rhetorical event
presents the possibility of clarifying the means used to discredit and, thereby,
to suppress the thoughts and views of J. Robert Oppenheimer.
Although much has been written about the events surrounding the hear
ing, the language—the rhetorical aspect—is the record of how the govern
ment conducted its challenge and is best viewed in the light of rhetorical
critic/theorist Kenneth Burke. Any one of Burke's statements about the
definition, function, and scope of rhetoric applies to the proceedings. Rhet
oric is concerned with conscious or unconscious strategies for outwitting
one another; it is "the region ... of insult and injury,... malice and lie ..."
(Burke, Permanence and Change 274). Certainly the participants used words
"to form attitudes or induce actions" (Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 41), for
or against Oppenheimer. Rhetoric exists in every meaning, verbal or non
verbal, and in every meaning there is persuasion. In addition, Burke's "ad
ministrative rhetoric" typifies the whole conduct of the hearing from the
rhetoric of the words to a rhetoric of action that spoke much louder than
words (Holland 54-55).
Within several of the pivotal terms in Burkeian rhetorical theory, a method
exists for achieving a more discerning view than any currently preferred
regarding the nature of the Oppenheimer affair and the means by which
the AEC reached its verdict. Pivotal Burkeian terms which figure significantly
6
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in an analysis of the hearing include "Identification," "Hierarchy/Order,"
"Guilt," and "Victimage."
"Identification," cited by Burke as "one's material and mental ways of
placing oneself as a person in groups and movements; one's way of sharing
vicariously in the role of leader or spokesman; formation and change of
allegiance," (Burke, Philosophy 227) figured prominently in analyzing rela
tionships of witnesses, attorneys, and judges. It is ironic, given testimony in
which twice as many statements indicated identification with Oppenheimer's
beliefs (in socialist causes, security matters, development of the hydrogen
bomb, loyalty to the U.S.) that the judges ruled counter to the preponder
ance of testimony. Rhetorical analysis indicated that factors other than the
weight of evidence affected the decision of the judges.
An excerpt from the testimony of Colonel John Lansdale, Jr., the security
officer for the Manhattan District at Los Alamos, represents an incidence of
presence of Identification.
[from cross-examination. Day 5, regarding character, loyalty, and associ
ations of an individual]
LANSDALE;... What I intended to convey was the appraisal or evaluation of
associations in the forties must be viewed in the light of the atmosphere
existing then and not in the light of the atmosphere existing at the present
time. ... [Y]ou can hardly put your finger on a scientist or a university pro
fessor or people who tend to get into civic affairs, you can hardly find one
anywhere who is now in his fifties or so that has not been on at least one list
of an association which was later determined to be subversive or to have
leanings that way.... I have never, strongly as I have felt and acted with
reference to Communism, never adopted the assumption, once a Communist
sympathizer, always a Communist sympathizer. . .. (Transcript 279)
Representative testimony from Ambassador George F. Kennan also reveals
the presence of Identification in the language of defense witnesses.
[from redirect examination. Day 7, regarding character, associations, and
loyalty of individuals]
KENNAN: I have often said it is the people who come to their views through
the questioning of other things who have the highest and finest type of
understanding in the interests of the Government. At any rate, it seems to
me that the exceptional people are often apt not to fit into an act or a series
of loyalty regulations I have always felt that the United States Government
has to realize that it has a real problem here, particularly with the people
who have the greater capacities. There is need here for considerable flexi
bility, and as I say at the outset, I think for looking at the man as a whole and
viewing his entire personality and not judging portions of it. (Transcript 368-69)
Each time a witness expressed positive Identification about Oppenheimer's
views, especially regarding his loyalty. Chairman Gordon Gray seemed ob
ligated to justify the role of the Personnel Security Board and the Atomic
Energy Act. In addition, government counsel Robb and Gray focused on
past and present elements of Identification. For example, in examining Kath-
erine Oppenheimer, Gray discredited her testimony because views she held
in 1940 differed from those she held in 1954. This strategy frequently ap
peared in the language of government counsel and the Board.
The many facets of the term "Identification" allowed for a variety of ways
in which to view the language and action of the hearing. Identification
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revealed loyaltles and enmities In relationships, and It exposed strategies
through which goals of counsel, both government and defense and members
of the Board may have been sought.
Burke's terms of "Hierarchy/Order," "Guilt," and "VIctlmage" seemed to
supply focal points for further observations. "Hierarchy" refers to the pat
terns In the socio-political structure that bind people together. Relationships
established by authority bind people to work within their hierarchical struc
ture. That structure Is bureaucratized, or given a definite organization, thus
providing "Order" within society. Numerous hierarchies may be embedded
In one another and an Individual may at times find a conflict between or
among them, e.g., the conscientious objector who finds conflict between
the dictates of the government and the dictates of the church. Violation of
"Hierarchy/Order" occurs through withdrawal, rebellion, or violence, and
language may be the means for rejecting the "hierarchy."
Rejection of "Hierarchy/Order" appears In the following excerpt from
Oppenhelmer's testimony.
[from direct examination. Day 1, regarding security procedures at Los
Alamos]
OPPENHEIMER: Our names were not known and our drivers [sic] licenses
were all made out under fictitious or artificial names. The laboratory was
guarded within the post and the post was guarded. We went to precautions
which did not do the trick, but which looked formidable at the time. I had
partly the job of devising these idiotic things and partly the job of making
them welcome. (Transcript 29)
A further example of support of Oppenhelmer and rejection of Hierarchy
In the guise of the Hearing was found In an exchange between Colonel John
Lansdale, jr., and Roger Robb, counsel for the government.
[from cross-examination. Day 5, regarding Oppenhelmer's loyalty]
LANSDALE:... I am extremely disturbed by the current hysteria of the time
of which this [the Hearing] seems to be a manifestation.
ROBB: You think this inquiry Is a manifestation of hysteria?
LANSDALE: I think—
ROBB: Yes or no?
LANSDALE: I won't answer that question "Yes" or "No." If you are tending
to be that way—if you will let me continue, I will be glad to answer your
question. (Transcript 269-70)
Analysis of the "Hierarchy/Order" terms further reveals that those who
oppose the principles of "order" may be considered "misguided sinners,"
or "villains who must be overcome" by the social order principles, or "here
tics who must be captured and put to death because only In their death Is
society purged of threats to the principles of order" (Duncan 97).
Disobeying the hierarchical principles leads to "Guilt," and awareness that
the carefully structured "Identifications" within the particular Hierarchy have
been threatened or damaged. The following excerpt Illustrates languages In
which there was attribution of Guilt toward Oppenhelmer and denial of
Guilt on his part.
[from cross-examination. Day 5, regarding Oppenhelmer's opposition to
the hydrogen bomb]
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ROBB:... [Y]ou were instrumental in persuading other outstanding scientists
not to work on the bomb....
OPPENHEIMER: I think I would be glad to deny it. I would like to know what
outstanding scientists I might have persuaded not to work on the bomb.
GRAY:... Did you attempt to persuade anyone not to work on the hydrogen
bomb?
OPPENHEIMER: No.
ROBB: ... Would you agree that you are or were the most experienced,
most powerful, and most effective member of the opposition to the hydrogen
bomb?
OPPENHEIMER: Well, I would say I was not the most powerful, I was not the
most experienced, and I was not the most influential.... (Transcript 232)
In contrast, attribution of Guilt, both by Oppenheimer and Robb, appears
throughout a segment of Oppenheimer's testimony on Day Three.
[from cross-examination. Day 3, regarding a 1943 security interview about
what came to be known as the Chevalier incident]
OPPENHEIMER:... I think I said little more than that Eltenton was somebody
to worry about.... Then I was asked why did I say this. Then I invented a
cock-and-bull story.. . .
ROBB: Now let us go back to your interview with Colonel Pash. Did you tell
Pash the truth about this thing?
OPPENHEIMER: No.
ROBB: You lied to him?
OPPENHEIMER: Yes.. ..
ROBB: So that we may be clear, did you discuss with or disclose to Pash the
identity of Chevalier?
OPPENHEIMER: No.
ROBB: Let us refer, then for the time being, to Chevalier as X.... Did you
tell Pash that X had approached three persons on the project? ... Didn't you
say X had approached three people?
OPPENHEIMER: Probably.
ROBB: Why did you do that. Doctor?
OPPENHEIMER: Because 1 was an idiot.
ROBB: Is that your only explanation. Doctor?
OPPENHEIMER: I was reluctant to mention Chevalier.
ROBB: Yes.
OPPENHEIMER: No doubt somewhat reluctant to mention myself....
ROBB: And didn't you know. Doctor, that by refusing to give the name of
X you were impeding the investigation?
OPPENHEIMER: I must have known that.. ..
ROBB: And yet you wouldn't tell them?
OPPENHEIMER: That is true. (Transcript 137-38)
Of the 320 Incidences of denial of Guilt regarding Oppenheimer's views
and actions, the following excerpt from the testimony of Dr. Vannevar Bush
represents those of the defense witnesses.
[from examination by Chairman Gray, Day 10, regarding development of
the hydrogen bomb]
BUSH: I feel that this board has made a mistake and that it is a serious one.
I feel that the letter of General Nichols which I read, this bill of particulars,
is quite capable of being interpreted as placing a man on trial because he
held opinions, which is quite contrary to the American system, which is a
terrible thing. And as I move about I find that discussed today very ener
getically, that here is a man who is being pilloried because he had strong
opinions, and had the temerity to express them. If this country ever gets to
tlie point where we come that near to the Russian system, we are certainly
9
et al.: Volume 26, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1988/Winter 1989/Spring 1989/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
6  SPEAKER AND GAVEL
not in any condition to attempt to lead the free world toward the benefits
of democracy. (Transcript 565)
That "Guilt" must be expiated, Burke says, in such a way that there is no
threat to the power of the Hierarchy. When the disobedience or opposition
is viewed as an evil in itself, then a public "Victim" must be found. The
"suffering and death" of the victim can be witnessed by the community as
a purgation of weakness in which the display of power may move the com
munity to a greater acceptance of "Hierarchy" and "Order" (Duncan 97-
98). Burke notes that a few strategies may make the "Victim" worthy or more
culpable. The "Victim" may be made worthy "legalistically" by making him
an offender against legal or moral justice, thus deserving of punishment, or
the "Victim" may be made worthy "fatalistically" by emphasizing personal
flaws and punishable pride (Burke, Philosophy 39-40). The selection of the
victim also has a curative role for those in power who have a need to blame
their troubles on others.
The following excerpts from the Transcript illustrate two incidences of
Victimage.
[from cross-examination. Day 5, regarding development of the hydrogen
bomb]
ROBB: Did you express that view in 1945?
OPPENHEIMER: I wrote a report. You see, I don't know to what this document
refers. Is this the Interim Committee report? If you will tell me where this is
alleged to have been written, I will confirm it. ... How can I confirm it without
knowing whether this is testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee,
or an interview with Colonel Eansdale or a report I made. (Transcript 227)
[from examination by Chairman Gray, Day 5, regarding statements about
a communication on the thermonuclear issue]
OPPENHEIMER: I would like to make a general protest. I am told that I have
said certain things. I don't recall it. I am asked if I said these what would that
be. This is an extremely difficult form for me to face a question. I don't know
what I said. It is of record. I had it in my vault for many years. (Transcript 241)
Another excerpt from the testimony of Dr. Edward Teller of Berkeley also
reflects a type of Victimage.
[from direct examination. Day 13, regarding Oppenheimer's government
work]
TELEER: . .. after the war Dr. Oppenheimer served on committees rather
than actually participating in the work. I am afraid this might not be a correct
evaluation of the work of committees in general, but within the AEC, I should
say that committees could go fishing without affecting the work of those who
are actively engaged in the work.
In particular, however, the general recommendations that I know have
come from Oppenheimer were more frequently a hindrance than a help,
and therefore, ... I think that further work of Dr. Oppenheimer on com
mittees would not be helpful. (Transcript 721)
An interchange between Garrison and Robb also reveals incidences of
Victimage in their language regarding Oppenheimer's access to informa
tion being read into the proceeding.
[from cross-examination. Day 3, of Oppenheimer regarding a security in
terview]
10
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol26/iss1/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 7
GARRISON: Mr. Chairman,... 1 wonder, however, if it would not be within
the proprieties of this kind of proceeding when counsel reads from a tran
script for us to be furnished with a copy of the transcript as he reads from
it. This, of course, is orthodox in a court of law. I don't pretend that this is
a court of law, but I do make the request because I don't know what else is
in the transcript, and if parts of it are read from, it would seem to me that it
would be proper for us to see what parts are not read from and to look at it
as a whole....
ROBB: I don't know, sir; this is presently marked "Secret" so I could not
make it available to Mr. Garrison at this time.
GARRISON: But it is being read into the record.
ROBB: That is right. (Transcript 147-48)
This issue remained a prominent aspect of Victimage throughout the Hear
ing. The following excerpt again illustrates that type of occurrence.
[from cross-examination, Day 4, of Oppenheimer regarding a security in
terview]
GARRISON: Mr. Chairman, what troubles me about this whole method of
examination is that counsel is reading from a transcript bits and parts without
the full course of the conversation which took place to a witness whose
memory at best, as anyone of ours would be, is very, very hazy upon all these
things, and picking here a sentence and there a sentence out of context, and
then holding him to answer. I do think that this is a method of questioning
that seems to me to be very unfair. (Transcript 210)
Coding and analyzing the language of the nineteen days of the Oppen
heimer Hearing clearly indicates that Oppenheimer was a "Victim." The
conclusions of the Personnel Security Board were not based solely on the
evidence offered by defense and government witnesses and attorneys. What
appeared was a sense that the verdict was almost foreordained—that no
matter the weight of the testimony, the Board and the AEG would have
reached the same conclusions.
In Burkeian terms, Oppenheimer had been selected as "Victim." He posed
a symbolic threat to the Hierarchical structure with his stance against nuclear
weapon stockpiling and his desire for openness with allies and enemies alike
in sharing scientific secrets. His marked influence in the scientific community
also made him a prime target.
By resurrecting security clearance issues from the 1940's and re-examining
them, and by challenging Oppenheimer's lack of enthusiasm for work on
the hydrogen bomb, the government confronted his violation of "Hier
archy/Order." The old security issues and socialist inclinations became, in
Burke's terms, "sinister, secret adherence to an organized enemy alien pow
er," and the hydrogen bomb issue became "temperamental deviation from
the prevailing orthodoxy (Burke, Rhetoric of Religion 195). Therefore, as a
"misguided sinner" and "secular variant of the heretic," Oppenheimer be
came a most visible villain because of his preeminent role in scientific and
government circles. When he chose to answer the initial allegations in a
security clearance hearing, the way was paved for the purgation of his weak
ness and the mastery of "Hierarchy" and "Order" in the community.
Thus, Oppenheimer was made a worthy "Victim" of sacrifice by means of
the security clearance hearing. In Burkeian terms, he was made worthy
"legalistically" because he was viewed as one who had offended legal and
moral justice through his thermonuclear reservations. He was made worthy
11
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"fatalistically" because he was seen as someone who had thought himself
above the law when he withheld information from security officers in the
1940s. With Oppenheimer as "Victim," the verdict of the Personnel Security
Board and the subsequent recommendations by General Manager Nichols
and the Atomic Energy Commission carried out Burke's "Cult of the Kill"
(Burke, Rhetoric of Religion 5). That "killing" involved not only the decision
to remove his security clearance, but also the attempt to discredit and im
pugn the character of J. Robert Oppenheimer. The language of the security
clearance hearing was the instrument by which that was accomplished. The
pivotal terms of Kenneth Burke provide the means of effectively analyzing
the language.
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North Dakota State University
Matthew Seeger
Wayne State University
October 19, 1987 was the largest one day loss in the history of the New
York Stock exchange. The Dow Jones industrial averaged plunged over 500
points or 23 percent (Pennar, Berger, & Farrell). Cumulative losses for the
day are estimated as high as $500 billion (Bartlett). Almost 604.3 million shares,
double the previous record volume, changed hands (Cowan). Shock and
concern spread throughout the nation and the world as observers began
drawing parallels with the crash of 1929. Throughout the crisis officials from
the financial community sought to communicate explanations and solutions
while calming the population. This essay analyzes the messages sent by fed
eral and private members of the financial community on October 19, 1987
and the following week. Several theories of crisis management along with
Burke's concept of purification and the concept of organizational legitimacy
are applied to these messages. Specifically, the crisis messages of the financial
community are discussed and evaluated within the framework of Burke's
concept of purification through victimage and mortification.
Crisis
Gouran states that a crisis differs from other events requiring decision-
making because of the "... unexpectedness and sense of urgency that their
threatening qualities create for a speedy resolution" (174). Similarly, Fink
sees crisis as any situation which runs the risk of: 1) escalating in intensity,
2) falling under close media or governmental scrutiny, 3) interfering with
the normal operations of business, 4) jeopardizing the positive image pres
ently enjoyed by a company or its officers, and 5) damaging a company's
bottom line in any way (15-16). Fundamentally, then, a crisis is a threat to
an organization's legitimacy. Pfeffer and Salancik note that legitimacy is a
form of social support and "can be achieved only if one is able to argue
convincingly that what the organization is doing is just or worthy" (195).
Legitimacy represents a congruence between organizational activities, prod
ucts, procedures and larger social norms. A crisis in legitimacy occurs "when
either discourse becomes an inadequate justification of and/or major insti
tutional responses do not fulfill legitimate expectations" (Turkel). Moreover,
when crisis erupts, the parties involved are forced to cope with what Billings,
Milburn, and Schaalman term response uncertainty. In short, a crisis situation
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-4 (1989), 9-18.
13
et al.: Volume 26, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1988/Winter 1989/Spring 1989/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
10 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
requires the communication of explanations and justifications to alleviate
threats to legitimacy. The reasoning behind the response, however, is usually
clouded by uncertainty.
One approach to studying crisis involves a three phase model of pre-crisis,
crisis, and post crisis for analysis. The pre-crisis stage is a time of warning
where the first signs of an impending crisis occur. These signs are frequently
subtle and may not be perceived as warnings. In the crisis phase, the crisis
erupts resulting in immediate damage. The focus in the crisis phase, then,
is on limiting damage and preventing escalation. During this phase, decision-
maker attention is first called to the crisis by virtue of a trigger event. Finally,
during post crisis a dialogue is constituted about cause, blame, and the factors
necessary to insure against reoccurrence. The adequacy of this response
often determines long term damage. Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman discuss
three types of crisis responses: 1) inaction, 2) routine solutions, and 3) original
solutions (304). Inaction involves no response. Routine solutions involve
reliance upon precedence or pre-crisis planning. Original solutions are cre
ated specifically for a particular crisis situation.
An additional concept important to this study concerns the communi
cation act of blaming and scapegoating. Seeger concluded from a study of
the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster that moving beyond a crisis frequently
requires "processes to publicly demonstrate and dramatize the organiza
tion's efforts to deal with the crisis. This may include identifying the likely
cause(s) of the crisis, assigning guilt, and identifying steps to insure that similar
situations do not re-occur" ("Investigating Commissions" 1). Kenneth Burke
described this assignment of guilt as part of the act of purification. He claims
that society finds order through hierarchy. An organization occupies a spe
cific position in a social hierarchy which is associated with the organization's
legitimacy (Philosophy of Literary Form). To maintain position and legitimacy,
organizations meet the demands of the established order in part by com
plying with general social norms. A crisis is an extreme disturbance in the
status quo, disrupting operations and threatening survival. Thus, hierarchical
position and legitimacy are threatened. This general inability or unwillingness
to meet the expectations of society results in guilt according to Burke's
dramatistic framework. Burke states that cancelling or purifying guilt is ac
complished through two strategies: 1) victimage or scapegoating and 2) mor
tification (The Rhetoric of Religion). In victimage, an appropriate victim is
selected and saddled with the guilt. Pfeffer and Salancik note that such
scapegoating is commonly employed by organizations when problems can
not be readily resolved (239). Burke argues that in mortification, one absolves
guilt through an inner struggle. Burke describes mortification as "the ex
ercising of oneself in 'virtue'; it is a systematic way of saying no to Disorder
or obediently saying yes to Order" (The Rhetoric of Religion 190). This process
of embracing social order is rooted both in the fundamental concept of
organization and of its assessment of legitimacy. As Burke states, "The mor
tified must, with one aspect of himself, be saying no to another aspect..."
(The Rhetoric of Religion 190). This inner struggle most often translates into
some tangible change of internal operations. As Pfeffer and Salancik note,
however, major internal changes in organizational operations are costly and
are avoided whenever possible. In short, then, an organization may absolve
14
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itself of guilt and re-establish legitimacy by assigning blame to key individuals,
by accepting blame and altering its internal structure and behavior, or both.
Black Monday as Crisis
The market crash of October 19,1987 meets Fink's criteria for crisis. First,
an extreme risk of escalation in intensity existed as stockholders panicked
and sold their holdings. A sense of urgency and a belief that inaction would
lead to devastating consequences served to accelerate the crisis. Observers
admitted that there was no way of knowing just how low the market would
fall. Several traders commented that "It was like trying to catch a falling
knife" (Dentzer, Thomas, Wang, Friday, & Brian 51). Declining stock prices
were magnified by reports of dramatic declines in the London, Hong Kong,
and Tokyo exchanges (Cowan). Second, the stock market collapse topped
the media's agenda for nearly two weeks. Network news began with reports
from major stock exchanges, interviewed members of the financial com
munity and the Reagan Administration. Third, the uncertainty generated by
the falling market disrupted normal operations. Wall Street was forced to
suspend all trading for short periods and certain computerized trading in
definitely. Fourth, the crash threatened the images of the Wall Street firms
and the Reagan Administration. Both groups are charged with the respon
sibility of assuring such drastic disruptions in the status quo of the markets
do not occur. Both had benefited significantly from the sustained growth
of the "Bull" market. As such, they were the most appropriate sources for
explanations and justifications. Finally, the stock market drop seriously dam
aged the profitability of Wall Street firms with many counting their losses in
millions of dollars.
Most directly, however, as stocks declined the financial markets lost le
gitimacy. Long established investment opportunities and expectations of
sustained economic growth were suddenly gone. Markets which were the
leading edge of Reaganomics were pointing toward recession. Millions of
individual investors had lost significant portions of their wealth. As one
financial observer noted "Behind the crash lies a loss of confidence in eco
nomic and political leadership" ("Extraordinary Butcher" 76). In short, then,
the financial disaster of October 19, 1987 may be classified as a crisis not
only for Wall Street firms, but for the Reagan Administration and for millions
of individual investors.
Crisis Stages of Black Monday
A variety of messages were communicated by the financial community
and the Reagan Administrations during the chronic crisis stage. A pre-crisis
stage, however, manifested itself prior to Black Monday. Warnings of crisis
were well publicized in the pre-crisis stage. Pennar, Berger, and Farrell, for
example, suggest that the market was "... waffling for two months and send
ing some pretty strong signals for a couple of weeks" (44). In January of 1987,
Marshall Loeb, Editor of Fortune observed that "The market has shot up so
rapidly that I can absolutely guarantee that it will fall—fall quite possibly by
15
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10 percent, 20 percent or perhaps more" (371). The Reagan Administration
and the financial community either did not perceive, chose not to or were
unable to act upon the warnings of impending crisis.
The rapid decline of October 19 caught many by surprise. Two events
triggered the crisis. First, the Commerce Department's report for the August
trade deficit showed only slight improvement (Egan, Shapiro, Monroe, Black,
& Weiner). Second, treasury secretary james Bakker was quoted as publicly
criticizing West German policy and threatening a lower dollar ("Extraordinary
Butchery"). These events created uncertainty in economic indicators and
lack of credibility in the Reagan Administration. During the crisis stage, a
complete crash was averted primarily by those safety mechanisms installed
in the market following the crash of 1919. Two additional regulatory actions
were taken during this stage. First, the New York Stock Exchange placed
sharp limits on program trading which was thought to have accentuated the
crisis. Brokerage firms were barred from automatically executing trades
through the high-speed computer-to-computer links between brokerage
houses and the exchange floor (Sanger). Second, the New York Stock Ex
change closed two hours early on October 23, 1987 to allow the brokerage
firms an opportunity to catch up on the vast paper accumulated during the
week (De Maria).
Many observers expected President Reagan to halt trading in an effort to
reduce the impact during the crisis phase. Reagan, however, chose to release
a general statement on October 19,1987 indicating that the economists with
whom he had consulted, confirmed his view that "... the underlying econ
omy remains sound" (Fitzwater). Reagan also cited several economic statis
tics, including employment, manufacturing output, and the trade deficit, as
evidence of a sound economy. However, his "steady as she goes" approach
was eerily similar to President Hoover's October 1929 comments about de
clining stocks (Apple). With the exception of the two subtle measures taken
by the New York Stock Exchange, then, the financial industry and Reagan
Administration both depended upon what Billings et al. term routine so
lutions during the crisis stage.
Beyond the regulatory actions by Wall Street and statements by Reagan,
two additional factors helped halt the stock fall. First, on October 20, Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, announced that the Fed
would reverse its established policy of tight credit and instead make liquidity
available. This change was dramatic given the Fed's long established policy
of tight money to limit inflation. Second, many firms, seeing bargains in their
own stock and looking for ways to defend their share prices, started extensive
buy back programs ("Extraordinary Butchery" 76). These actions represented
original solutions and helped bring stability back to the market.
The post crisis stage began as soon as the market stabilized. The steady
but marginal improvement in the Dow Jones industrial average during the
two days immediately following the crash provided an opportunity for re
flection, identification of causes, assigning blame, and announcing changes.
This dialogue of justification and explanation following the crisis was played
out in the national media and involved officials from the Reagan Adminis
tration, the national and international financial industry, business leaders,
and stockholders.
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Purification
The post crisis stage is characterized by a search for explanations and
justifications to reduce uncertainty, move past the crisis and repair damaged
legitimacy. It is during this stage that guilt may be prominently assigned to
those who are deemed responsible or who might make appropriate scape
goats. The post crisis phase is also where acts of mortification involving
corrective changes in operations are likely to be announced. According to
Burke, acts of blaming produce feelings of having been cleansed or purified.
Moreover, victimage through scapegoating or mortification through changes
in internal operations, result in a disassociation with illegitimate activities.
Both the Reagan Administration and the financial community communicated
public messages of victimage and mortification during the early post crisis
stage of Black Monday which helped create a perception of purification.
The financial industry had expressed strong concern about the twin budget
and trade deficits prior to Black Monday and strongly reiterated that concern
in its aftermath. In an act of victimage, blame for the economic turmoil was
placed on the rising deficits produced by the inactivity of Congress and the
Reagan Administration. Salomon Brothers' chief economist Henry Kaufman,
for example, summarized this concern with, "The twin deficits are coming
home to roost" (Egan et al.). Similarly, Richard Heckler, Chairman of E. I.
du Pont, noted that "We all have a pretty good idea that the underlying
reason was nervousness about deficits—budget and trade— and associated
concerns about interest rates and inflation, [sic] The political leadership needs
to get its act together and bring the books into some semblance of balance"
(2). John M. Makin of the American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy
Research further criticized the Reagan Administration for its inactivity re
garding the budget and trade deficits by noting that "This is not the sort of
thing that can be cleared up with a couple of press conferences" (McNamee
& Magnusson 47). The financial community clearly identified the twin deficits
as the primary causes of the crash and attributed them to the Federal Gov
ernment's fiscal policies. Moreover, they sought specific and tangible cor
rective actions. This criticism of the Reagan Administration by some of its
staunchest supporters was a powerful inducement for change.
In the wake of Black Monday, however, the financial industry also turned
to self-analysis. This self-analysis resulted in specific acts of mortification.
Beginning in 1982, Wall Street had seen unprecedented growth of a Bull
market. This widespread and sustained growth, however, was not always
backed by underlying economic strength. Sarah Bartlett in Business Week
summarized this tendency;
For too long prosperity was built on the notion that there was no tomorrow.
Wall Street firms grew ferociously, hiring bright young MBAs who based their
search for fame and fortune on program trading, futures, and options. And
when some speculators got caught cheating. Wall Street seemed to shrug it
off after a brief bout of worry. Investors, seeking even higher returns, bought
paper backed by paper backed by paper. Fueled by such financial exuberance,
companies went on an uninhibited takeover romp, and consumers immersed
themselves in debt. (42)
Some members of the brokerage business argued that this rapid growth had
fundamentally changed the personality of Wall Street. Powell and Friday
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quoted one high-level executive at a top firm as saying that Black Monday
proved .. that we weren't immune from a fundamental truth: anything
that seems too good to be true, is" (56). Martin L. Leibowitz, Salomon Broth
ers' top analyst, indicated that the brokerage industry is in need of major
changes in noting that, "This is violatility of a nature we've not seen be
fore. ... All our equations will have to be reworked" (Bianco 47). Perrin Long
of Lippert Analytical Services offered an optimistic response to the Black
Monday turmoil. He noted that, "This could be the beginning of the long-
awaited retrenchment on Wall Street" (Bock 33). These statements by prom
inent leaders of the financial community helped set the stage for mortifi
cation. Through a recognition of the need for change and its inevitability,
the painful and costly process of mortification, however, was facilitated.
In addition to indicating its willingness to reform, the financial community
communicated a powerful message by thinning its ranks. Following Black
Monday, hundreds of young, well-paid brokers were released from major
brokerage firms (Bock). Surprisingly, many of these newly released brokers
approached the situation in a matter-of-fact style. Powell et al. state that,
"As the stock market's plunge accelerated. Wall Street's finest weren't lining
up by office windows to jump, a la 1929; they were lining up by Xerox
machines running off copies of their resumes" (55). These actions suggest
that the Wall Street community realized and accepted the fact that a change
in philosophy was inevitable.
President Reagan also struck an accepting tone through his admission that
the budget deficit had played a major role in bringing about Black Monday.
He did not, however, accept blame for the deficit. Instead, Reagan estab
lished Congress as the victim. At no point during the days surrounding Black
Monday was Reagan as pointed in his attack on Congress as during his
October 22, 1987 news conference. Many of the questions concerned his
announcement that he would meet with members of Congress in an effort
to reduce the trade and budget deficits. When asked if it took a crisis to get
the President to meet with Congress, Reagan argued that if Congress had
passed his budget the deficit "would have been $207 billion less than it
turned out to be" (A8). When asked directly if the White House should share
equally in the blame for the deficit, Reagan refused to move from his ar
gument that Congress was to blame. He said:
Well, just a minute. The President of the United States cannot spend a nickel.
Only Congress can authorize the spending of money, and for six years now
I have repeatedly asked Congress for less money and they have turned around,
given more to spend and done it in such a way that I can't veto it when they
put it all together instead of appropriations in continuing resolution. (A8)
On another level, however, the President performed an act of mortifi
cation by initiating a meeting with Congress. Throughout 1987 Reagan had
insisted that he would not bargain with Congress when it came to matters
of the budget. Yet, during his October 22, 1987 news conference Reagan
announced that he would be meeting with the leaders of Congress as soon
as possible. This decision meant the President had, as McNamee and Mag-
nusson state," ... yielded the critical inch of ground that he's held all year
..." (47).
This was a notable shift for Reagan. His initial response to the stock market
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crash was to deny its significance. In an official White House statement on
October 19,1987 Reagan was quoted as saying that .. our view is that the
underlying economy remains sound" (D32). Reagan went on to support this
claim with specific examples regarding the expansion of the economy and
the low inflation rate. This process is consistent with Burke's view of victim-
age and mortification. Burke states that victimage is homicidal in that it
involves the assignment of guilt to an external agent. Conversely, mortifi
cation is suicidal in that to be mortified one must absolve guilt through
internal change (The Rhetoric of Religion 190). In fact, the President even
indicated in his October 22 news conference that he would listen to a
discussion of tax increase. This is something he had not been willing to do
at any other point during his presidency. When asked about the meeting
during his press conference, the President said:
[Sic] my program had $22 billion of additional revenues in it. I have said
additional revenue. There are other things you can do that are not deterrent
to the economy such as taxes can be, but what I've said was, all right, I'll
listen to them and what they have in mind, in answer to this problem, but I
expect them to listen to what I have in mind, and the bulk of these $22 billion
have nothing to do with taxes. (A8)
Reagan's compromise was called a "special effort" by White House spokes
persons and represented a significant shift toward self mortification (Quint
D1). By offering to meet Congress, Reagan shifted from a strategy firmly
committed to throughout his presidency which had been the cornerstone
of the Reaganomics program through a novel response to the crisis. Fun
damentally, then, Reagan was simultaneously accepting and denying re
sponsibility for Black Monday.
Impact of Purification Messages
The messages of victimage communicated by the Reagan Administration
and the financial community were not new. Reagan had blamed Congress
for the budget deficit since his first year in office. Similarly, members of the
financial community had criticized the growing federal and trade deficits
and the Administration's unwillingness to deal with them. These remarks
were routine and rekindled consistent and familiar criticisms but did little
to restore confidence in the economy. The magnitude of the criticism,
however, served as an impetus for subsequent mortification.
The messages of mortification communicated by Reagan and Wall Street
were more effective in alleviating the crisis and renewing legitimacy than
those of victimage. Reagan was praised by Wall Street following his October
22, 1987 news conference. Industry observers indicated that his willingness
to negotiate with Congress was a step in the right direction. Richard Lesher,
President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said of Reagan's address, "It
was a cool, calm approach and just what was warranted. Things aren't going
to hell, even though they've been exciting" (Berg D12). A Business Week
Harris Poll conducted on October 23-25, 1987 indicated that the American
public was gaining confidence, but was concerned about the future of the
economy. Seventy-seven percent of those stockholders surveyed indicated
they had at least some confidence in the people who run Wall Street. Four-
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teen percent said they had a great deal of confidence and 63 percent said
they had some (Berger & Dunkin).
Conclusions
Both the Reagan Administration and Wall Street communicated messages
of victimage and mortification when the stock market failed to follow ex
pectations for legitimate operation. The messages of victimage were routine,
while the messages of mortification were more original responses to the
specific situation. Wall Street's most effective messages, however, came in
the post crisis stage and concerned mortification. The budget and trade
deficits were targeted as causes of Black Monday. Wall Street used this
explanation to blame Congress and the Reagan Administration for the eco
nomic downfall. Blaming Congress and the Administration in itself, however,
was not sufficient. Wall Street had grown rapidly in the five years of prosperity
from 1982-1987. With this growth came a reputation of greed, deceit and
insensitivity. Stories of insider trading, ruthless takeovers, and unrestrained
greed were common and severely compromised legitimacy. Had Wall Street
executives addressed Black Monday simply by placing all blame on the twin
deficits, it is doubtful they would have garnered much public support. Wall
Street's negative reputation required more than victimage. Rather, morti
fication and substantive reform were required to rebuild public confidence.
Moreover, reliance on strategies of victimage alone may damage legitimacy
further if the blame is perceived by the public as inappropriate. By treating
the crash as an opportunity for reform, the brokerage industry was able to
regain some legitimacy.
For the Reagan Administration, Black Monday was a unique situation re
quiring an original response manifest in a form of self mortification. By
opening his budget to compromise, Reagan abandoned a long-held policy
of refusing to negotiate on budget matters. However, Reagan was careful to
temper his message of compromise with a very powerful message of victim-
age. Reagan had consistently blamed Congress for the entire budget deficit
problem. This routine message enabled him to maintain his image of lead
ership while simultaneously compromising. Had Reagan not offered a mes
sage of mortification along with victimage, however, it is likely that he would
not have regained Wall Street's confidence. It has frequently been suggested
that negative events such as crises do not stick to Reagan's image. In these
instances avoiding association with the "causes" of Black Monday involve
skillfully justapositioning of victimage and mortification strategies.
The present study also suggests that victimage may be the first choice in
managing crisis conditions and may involve routine responses. Burke sug
gests that when individuals feel guilt there is an immediate and compelling
temptation to respond with victimage (The Rhetoric of Religion 191). More
over, victimage is a less costly and faster strategy than mortification. Reagan
and Wall Street initially provided explanations and justifications through
strategies of victimage adopted well before Black Monday. Similarly, orga
nizations who handle crisis by blaming the economy or firing a few prominent
figures are typically adhering to routine responses to crisis. The present
analysis, however, suggests that specific conditions may make victimage a
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less successful purification strategy. In this instance, for example, blaming
Congress was a routine response which had lost all novel appeal. Further,
using Congress as a victim seemed self serving in light of the Reagan Admin
istration's refusal to address the twin deficits. Finally, the crisis appeared to
be associated more directly with a system of decision making which tended
to create adversarial relationships than with any individual or group. Similar
conditions in other crises may also reduce the effectiveness of victimage
strategies.
In this instance, however, the unsuccessful efforts at victimage set the
stage for subsequent mortification by providing support for changes. Mor
tification requires review and realignment of internal structures, procedures
and philosophy with generally accepted norms of conduct. Moreover, mor
tification strategies are most costly and substantive. Messages of mortifica
tion, then, tend to be more productive in managing perceptions of crisis
and renewing legitimacy by providing original solutions to crisis. Conse
quently, the more costly mortification strategies are likely employed after
victimage has been attempted.
Messages of victimage are frequently appropriate means for salvaging the
legitimacy of an organization. A message of mortification, however, can
enhance a perception of preventive, long-term change and renewed social
legitimacy. Such change suggests that the organization has responded to
critics, taken control of its own destiny and can avert a similar crisis in the
future. Simply assigning blame to individuals or outside parties may com
municate unwillingness or inability to avoid future crises.
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THE CIMETER: CASE STUDY IN THE
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT
William L. Benoit
University of Missouri, Columbia
David Davis
Stockton and Associates
The use and abuse of alcohol has been an issue of significant social concern
since colonial times. An increased awareness of this issue occurred during
the 1800s, especially in the two extremes, the large urban industrial cities
and the small, developing frontier towns. The state of Missouri played a
major role in the frontier development and in supplying goods and services
to these towns. St. Louis, Missouri, became the "Gateway to the West," and
so Missouri generally and St. Louis particularly played a key role in the
temperance drama in other cities, towns, and wide spots on the trail. Ac
cordingly, this study examines a temperance newspaper {The Cimeter) pub
lished in St. Louis by Bruce G. W. Hughes in 1884-1885 in order to discover
and evaluate the rhetorical strategies used in the struggle against acceptance
of the consumption of alcohol. This topic is a timely one, because today
sentiment against drinking (especially when combined with driving) is higher
than in recent years. Charles Stewart's approach to the rhetorical study of
movements (Stewart, Smith, and Denton) will be employed for this analysis.
A brief overview of temperance in the United States through the 1800s
provides the backdrop for tbis study.
The Background of the Temperance Controversy
Emergence of the Alcohol Problem
The early American settlers found their "promised land" full of hardships
and freezing cold winters, so the colonists and settlers justifiably consumed
considerable alcohol. The early morning shot of whiskey became a pre-
breakfast tradition, relieving chills, fever, and symptoms of malaria. The eye
openers of whiskey, rye, brandy, and rum became an institution for hygienic
purposes. In the 1880s New York's breakfast tables were often garnished
with brandy, cider, or sangaree (Furnas 17). People were impressed with the
potency of alcohol; some proclaimed it to be good for everything that ailed
humankind. One advocate for alcohol wrote that
It sioweth age ... It strengtheneth youth; it helpeth digestion; It cutteth
flegme; It abandoneth melanchoile; It rellsheth the heart; It llghteneth the
mind; It quickeneth the spirits; It strengtheneth the hydropsle; It healeth the
strangurle; It pounceth the stone; It expeiieth the gravel; It puffeth away
ventosltle; It keepeth and preserveth the head from whirling, the eyes from
dazzling, the tongue from lisping, the throat from rattling; It keepeth the
reason from stiffening; keepeth the hands from shivering, the sinews from
shrinking, the veins from crumbling, the bones from aching, and the morrow
from soaking. (Furnas 18)
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-4 (1989), 19-30.
23
et al.: Volume 26, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1988/Winter 1989/Spring 1989/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
20 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
Given these beliefs, it is not surprising to discover that most people viewed
suppliers of drink as public heroes. Taverns of New England were social
institutions, places for the meeting of the minds, councils and social groups.
Tavern owners usually held high position in their community and often were
deacons in the church. In early America the only drinkers who received
social penalties were the flagrant disorderly drunks; those who were con
sidered to be "dangerous nuisances" were officially listed as "common
drunks."
However, since tavern keepers wanted to maintain their popularity and
make a profit on the drinks they served, they would often give the benefit
of the doubt to the customers who might be "common drunks." In the early
1800s the list of town drunks was sometimes so long that it resembled the
roster of eligible voters in the town (Furnas 24-25). Inevitably, the respon
sibility and character of liquor establishments began to decline.
As the American frontier expanded, brewers and distillers expanded their
market and supplied frontier life with their products. New towns had their
saloons, providing a variety of alcoholic goods and services, run by frontier
entrepreneurs concerned with profit. Alcohol and prostitution became
common features of the frontier saloons. As a result, families experienced
abuse, economic loss, and sometimes death. Hence, as drinking increased,
so did the problems associated with it.
The Emergence of the Temperance Movement
The gradual recognition of this drinking problem gave rise to the tem
perance movement. Temperance advocates often expressed their views in
lecture halls or wherever people would gather in cities or towns. These
lecturers would travel throughout the country, attempting to leave a lasting
impression on their audiences. They provided a clearly antithetical account
to the praise of alcohol quoted above:
Spirits ... impair the memory, debilitate the understanding, and pervert the
moral faculties... produce not only falsehood, but fraud, theft, uncieanilness,
and murder. . .. How deep the anguish which rends the bosom of the drun
kard's wife ... the shame and aversion which she excited in her husband! Is
he the father of children? See their averted looks... their blushing looks at
each other! Is he a magistrate? ... What humiliating fears of corruption in
the administration of the laws ... in the countenance of all who see him!...
As to economics: behold drunkard's houses stripped gradually of their fur
niture ... to pay tavern debts . . . houses with shattered windows .. . barns
with leaky roofs, gardens over-run with weeds.. . fields with broken fences
.  .. children filthy and half clad, without manners, principles, or morals ...
addiction to spirits, soundly enough, amounts to slow suicide. (Furnas 11)
The United States appeared to many to be a society with major alcohol
problems. In the 1840s through 1850s temperance reformers slowed their
efforts, but following the Civil War, saloons multiplied and the problem
resurfaced (Bordin xiv).
In nineteenth-century America, alcohol was considered by numerous ob
servers to be a social evil. Many citizens were heavy users of alcohol, which
was deemed more important than food itself. Alcohol was usually cheaper
than milk and safer to drink than water. Alcohol supposedly supplied a
sustaining energy for the hard-working laborer while supplying warmth for
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cold winter days. Drink was perceived in the favorable terms used by earlier
Americans—as medicine, anesthetic, and analgesic. In short, it simply func
tioned as an integral part of the American way of life (Bordin 5-6).
The strength of the temperance movement emerged through church-
related networks. Fundamental temperance ideology was couched in Biblical
warnings against intemperance and supported with New Testament com
mands for temperance. Joseph Gusfield argues that native American Prot
estants of the nineteenth century respected temperance ideals. In other
words, they praised self-control, industriousness and made renunciation of
impulse a necessity for life. Sobriety was a virtue for white, middle-class
Protestants. Gusfield suggests that curtailment of alcohol sales was a simple
way of solving the problems presented by a poor urban immigrant whose
culture clashed with American Protestantism (Gusfield 4-6). Gusfield's view
may be correct; unfortunately, his perspective is incomplete in that he ig
nores the realities of the liquor problem in the United States. Specifically,
he fails to consider the rhetoric of temperance, a justification for a rhetorical
study of the temperance movement.
Within the Protestant churches, three distinct forms of social Christianity
were visible in the temperance movement. The first was conservative social
Christianity. This view accepted the principles of individualistic reform; that
is, reform on a voluntary basis. The conservative was by no means an advocate
of institutional change. Second, radical Christianity used religious doctrine
as a foundation for an attack on the existing social and economic order. This
ideology wanted to create a new social system, and resulted in Christian
socialism. Third, the progressive social Christianity held a position between
the conservative and radical perspectives. The basic desire of the progressive
was for institutions to operate in a moral manner (May). All three forms of
Christianity were types of assimilative reform. As Christians, they were ba
sically concerned with the plight of the urban poor and the conditions
produced by the factory systems of industry. Through reforming the drinker,
the middle class professional and businessman coped with urban problems
in a way that affirmed cultural dominance. They perceived the drinker as
poor, alien, or downtrodden. He could lift himself up to meet the expec
tations of the reformers, finding middle class respectability and income.
When assimilative reform failed to bring overall results, the coercive reform
was adapted. Coercive reform was the legislation of laws with accompanying
enforcement as the means to affirm social dominance. Prohibition was the
battle cry for the coercive reformist (Gusfield 7).
The temperance movement was a mixed bag of ideology for doing battle
against the evils of alcohol. Variety in the movement existed because of the
different church affiliations, doctrines, philosophies, or epistemological roots.
The very fact that three different perspectives on Christianity existed—
conservative, radical, and progressive—demonstrates the diversity of the
movement. Despite this diversity, they shared a common goal: to rid society
of the evils of alcoholic substance. The goal would be realized in two ways:
the first would prohibit production of alcohol, and the second would ban
the sale of alcohol. The accomplishment of these two goals would improve
family life, raise economic productivity, lower crime, add years to many lives,
and bestow the virtue of sobriety on our nation.
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In order to accomplish the intended goal, the temperance movement
adopted three distinct forms. First, a group of lecturers traveled about the
country from town to town as evangelists for the temperance cause. They
were powerful speakers, many of whom were clergy, professors of science
or persons of public speaking ability. They attempted to persuade people
to sign a pledge card for the cause of temperance. Second, organizations
developed for everyone to join, providing opportunity for personal involve
ment. There were organizations for men, women, young men, young wom
en, and children. Some of the organizations were the International Order
of Good Templars, Good Templars, Christian Temperance Union, Women's
Christian Temperance Union, and junior Templars. Elaborate structures built
cellular networks that extended from neighborhoods, to towns, to countries,
to states, and ultimately, to national offices. This movement provided a unique
support system for members and offered fellowship in a fraternal sense.
Third, weekly newspapers devoted to the temperance cause were founded
in several states as key organs of communication. The role of these papers
was to inform the readership, recruit sympathizers to join the cause, and
sustain the existing membership.
The function of temperance newspapers was similar to that of the Populist
newspapers (Goodwin 164, 206-07). They became the voice of the move
ment. Like the Populist papers, the temperance papers usually suffered from
inadequate finances. Despite the fact that most of their readers could not
afford to pay the annual subscription cost, the paper was usually sent because
the publishers believed they were fighting a moral battle. Accordingly, these
papers were frequently money losing enterprises, with a short life.
This study examines The Cimeter, a weekly temperance newspaper pub
lished in St. Louis in 1884-1885. This newspaper was selected because it
typifies temperance papers in the midwest, and it gained a respectable cir
culation. The publisher was the Reverend G. W. Hughey, who was the Pastor
of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church in St. Louis from 1879 to 1881 (Scharf
1687). Reverend Hughey was involved in temperance work in various ca
pacities. He often traveled throughout Missouri on speaking engagements,
wrote several books on temperance, and contributed support and leadership
to the different organizations of temperance (Hughey). As suggested earlier,
this analysis is designed to reveal the rhetorical strategies employed by this
newspaper in the fight against alcohol use.
The Functional Approach to Movements
Scholars hold that rhetorical patterns occur in various configurations of
public discourse. While emphasis has often been placed on explication of
events, people, and strategies (Griffin; Smith), many believe that persuasion
is the basic agency for social movements. Persuasion is used when functions
or events confront the established norm or the status quo. It is through this
dialectic confrontation that change often evolves (Andrews 196-98, 207-08;
Wilkinson 91; Stewart, Smith, and Denton 73).
Charles Stewart has proposed five basic elements as a functional scheme
for analyzing the rhetoric of social movements:
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1) Transforming perceptions of history.
Social movements must alter the way audiences perceive the past, present,
or future. For each movement there is a target audience. The social move
ment may find it necessary to revise their version of history over a period
of time.
2) Transforming perceptions of society.
Social movements must alter the perceptions of the opposition. Attempts
are made to strip opponents of their legitimacy. The self perceptions of
the movement must enable the supporters to believe in their self-worth
and ability to bring about change.
3) Prescribing courses of action.
Social movements must explain what needs to be done and who needs
to do it. A list of demands and solutions that will alleviate the existing
conditions must be explained or defended to the target audience if the
program of change is to occur.
4) Mobilizing the action.
The social movement must unite and organize discontents, arousing them
to action. Attempts to gain sympathy from opinion leaders is a must. The
action may be a strike, boycott, or simply gaining the attention or sympathy
of the public but action must occur.
5) Sustaining the movement.
A social movement may last for a prolonged period of time or at least until
the 'goal' is accomplished. In that period of time it may be necessary to
explain setbacks, justify why the movement goals have changed, or why
new leadership is needed. Activities such as fund raising, membership
drives, or acquisition of property or material may divert attention away
from needed functions. The membership's commitment must be rein
forced while providing satisfaction or membership gratification. These
activities will often limit the movement's ability to perform essential actions
needed for change, (summarizing Stewart 298-405)
Stewart's method is used because it provides a functional scheme for ana
lyzing the rhetoric of social movements while capturing its essence. How
the movement presents Its perception of history and society Indicates where
the movement has been, where It Intends to go, and the shared vision of
the participants. How a movement explains change or justifies new goals Is
critical In retaining existing members. This process may be one of the most
critical operations to occur In the life of a movement. By examining The
Cimeter with this method, a clearer picture of how this paper functioned as
a tool of the temperance movement and of the role persuasion played In It
should emerge. Incidentally, It Illustrates the utility of Stewart's approach to
movements.
The Rhetoric of The Cimeter
The Cimeter was an Integral part of the temperance movement. In general,
references to The Cimeter may be understood as reflections of the temper
ance movement. Each of the five areas Stewart Identifies will be analyzed In
turn to Illustrate the role discourse played In this Important historical move
ment.
Transforming Perceptions of History
The Cimeter was successful In transforming perceptions of history by al
tering how people viewed the past, present, and future Into Biblical terms.
Particular segments of scripture which obviously pertained to drink were
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interpreted in a manner which reinforced the temperance position. A regular
feature in The C/meter was "Biblical Doctrines of Temperance." The evidence
cited was totally based on Biblical text and examples. The heart of the tem
perance matter was generated from the New Testament verse written by
the historical figure Apostle Paul, "Be ye temperant in all things." The "Bibli
cal Doctrine of Temperance" always defined and clarified the temperance
position, i.e., "the moderation of that which is beneficial, and total abstinence
from that which is harmful" (The Cimeter, 3 Jan. 1884, 2). Scriptures cited
were chosen because they supported the ideas of temperance or abstinence.
Needless to say, a significant amount of Biblical history (i.e., people drinking)
had to be revised or simply ignored because it did not endorse abstinence.
It is not surprising that such Biblical accounts as Jesus turning the water into
wine, the use of wine in the Lord's supper, or Paul's advice to Timothy to
take a little wine for his stomach's sake, were absent, ignored or rationalized
to fit the temperance ideals. Such selective interpretation of the scriptures
seems designed to shape perceptions of the past in line with the goals of
the temperance movement, in an attempt to confer both Biblical and his
torical legitimacy on the movement.
The editor clearly states the present and future perception of The Cimeter:
The Cimeter will be nonsectarian, a nondenominational paper, but in a broad
sense Christian. The battle against liquor power can be fought on a line of
conscience and moral obligation. It is the intent of this paper to enlighten
for judgment, to appeal to the conscience of right or wrong of the great
question. (3 Jan. 1884, 2)
The Cimeter was identified historically (past, present, future) with Christianity
or Christ-likeness. If The Cimeter is Christian or Christ like, moral and right,
then the opposition (liquor power) is clearly perceived as devilish, immoral
and wrong. The conflict between temperance and liquor power is described
as a "battle ... fought on the issue of conscience and moral obligation."
Since The Cimeter is assumed to be morally right on the issue of temperance,
the audience will sense in their conscience this tightness and will be morally
obligated (future) to align in agreement with this paper (which represents
the temperance cause). The intent (present/future) of the paper is to "en
lighten" those who have not had the opportunity to see the light on the
issue (3 Jan. 1884, 2). Clearly, the past, present, and future as seen by The
Cimeter was that of "good" fighting against "evil."
Notice how this strategy utilizes appeals that are firmly rooted in the
audience's beliefs and values. Readers of The Cimeter were generally reli
gious. Hence, the Bible and ("Biblical Doctrine") were highly esteemed sources
lending credibility to the proposed transformation of audience perceptions
of history. This was reinforced by the strategies employed to accomplish the
second function identified by Stewart.
Transforming Perceptions of Society
As a result of The Cimeter's perception of "good" fighting against "evil,"
efforts were made to strip liquor power of its legitimacy. This was accom
plished by citing tragic examples of human suffering directly related to
consumption of alcohol. A byline from the St. Louis Globe Democrat pre-
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sented this event: "Ithaca, New York. John Klistron drank lager beer at Pat
Sheey's saloon this morning and died two hours later. Fred Hoffman drank
beer at the same place this afternoon and is in a comatose condition without
hope of recovery" (10 Jan. 1884, 6). Another example was entitled, "What
Whiskey Will Do?" A man in a New York county awakens in jail. He asks, "is
this a jail?" The reply, "yes." The man queries, "what am I here for?" The
reply, "for murder." He inquired, "does my wife know?" The answer, "yes,
she knows." Someone shouted out "why it was your wife you murdered?"
The reader is asked to remember that "the constable who carried him to
the jail sold the liquor that caused his drunkenness; the justice who issued
the warrant was the one who signed his license; the sheriff who hanged him
also sold liquor and kept a tin-pan alley" (31 Jan. 1884, 2). Another example
calls for patriotism in the crusade against our nation's greatest crime.
Nine of our ten murders are direct products of the distillery. There never
was a greater need for sturdy patriotism for heroic deeds than in this crusade
against the direct cause of murder, against not only the besetting sin of the
age, but our greatest national crime. (17 Apr. 1884, 5)
A direct correlation was asserted between liquor and crime. The warden of
the prison in Jefferson City was asked, "what effect would the closing up of
saloons in the state have on the population of the penitentiary?" The warden
replied, "it would reduce it ninety percent." He further suggested that out
of the 1,400 inmates, 1,050 came to the penitentiary as a result of saloons
(31 Jan. 1884, 5).
The Cimeter reflected the temperance movement in citing alcohol for all
social ills. Great effort was taken in reporting the association of alcohol with
death, crime, and corporate policies of business. A letter from the super
intendent of Wisconsin Central Railroad states that, "no man is fit to be
entrusted with the responsibilities of a railroad employee who uses any form
of intoxicating liquors" (10 Jan. 1884, 5). According to The Cimeter, it appears
that poor workmanship, crime, murder, and social deviance are directly
related to, if not caused by alcohol.
An apparent self-righteous perception of self worth by the temperance
movement can be found as the moral condition of the great cities of Chicago,
New York, Boston, and San Francisco is discussed.
Their aggregate wickedness is so enormous that one wonders at that divine
long suffering which saves them from the fate of Sodom. But is not their
marvelous preservation attributable, at least in part, to the presence of the
many righteous souls which they contain? Our cities have thousands whose
prayers are incessant, whose influence is the salt that preserves. How im
portant, therefore, to the life of cities, is the presence and power of the
church. (10 Jan. 1884, 6)
Temperance followers condemned tfie wickedness of the cities, while shar
ing a Biblical vision of their role in society as the salt that preserves. In reality
they are stating that their presence is the only thing holding back an im
pending doom or judgment similar to Sodom's. They see their role as im
portant and significant. As one WCTU (Women's Christian Temperance Union)
officer wrote, "we are the King's Soldier's absolutely and persistently moving
under the King's order" (20 Mar. 1884, 4). The followers of temperance
believed in their self-worth and their ability to bring about change. Note
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how sharply these depictions of the evils of drink (if accepted) completely
reshape the perceptions of the role of alcohol in society (as a normal, healthy,
accepted part of life) prevalent before the temperance movement.
Perceptions of society held by the members of The Cimeter's audience
were shaped through the use of concrete examples of the victims of alcohol
abuse, which tend to be easily apprehended. Also, drunkenness is a problem
that manifests itself in each individual drinker (as opposed to, for example,
a flood or hurricane, where many are hurt simultaneously). Hence, the use
of specific examples is an appropriate means for displaying the nature of the
problem. Crime in general and murder in particular are directly linked to
use of evil spirits. Here as well we find religious allusion ("King's Soldiers")
employed. These factors combine to shape their view of contemporary so
ciety, so as to highlight the severity and extent of the problems caused by
consumption of alcohol. Now, a solution was needed.
Prescribing Courses of Action
Clear prescribed courses of action could be found in The Cimeter. The
basic course of action suggested by the editor was "to legalize prohibition
and the sale of alcohol" (3 Jan. 1884, 2). Again the editor provided a course
of action that might have been viewed as a solution; "we shall, however,
support only good temperance men for office, regardless of the party to
which they belong ... to compel all political parties to join in the war against
liquor power" (3 Jan. 1884, 2). It was plausible to see a mobilizing or uniting
for an effort to gain sympathy from the political parties. After all, what
political party would want to be against Christ, Christians, righteousness,
morality and good? A subtle threat was issued to all parties who would not
comply in fighting against liquor power.
As the paper grew in circulation—4,000 by June 1884 (19 Jun. 1884, 4)—
so did references to the Prohibitionist Party (25 Dec. 1884, 4). The platform
of the Prohibitionist Party was printed in The Cimeter (allegedly at the request
of the readers) and a judgment made by the paper; "we believe that this
National Platform embodies the true principles upon which to erect a grand
party of genuine reform" (25 Dec. 1884, 4). Political expression increased
over time in The Cimeter. When the Republican Party was silent over the
liquor question in their platform of 1884, a stern rebuke was given by The
Cimeter to the Republican Party (25 Dec. 1884, 5). The Republicans and the
Democrats competed for the liquor vote, so good citizens should imme
diately withdraw from all connections with these parties (25 Dec. 1884, 3).
Several distinct prescribed courses of action emerged from The Cimeter: (1)
legalized prohibition, (2) support only temperance men for political office,
(3) compel political parties to join the temperance cause, (4) endorsement
of the Prohibitionist Party, and (5) open criticism of political parties.
This indicates how the temperance movement (as exemplified by The
Cimeter) attempted to co-opt the competing political parties. This strategy
is fairly obvious, for legislative means are often seen as a "quick-fix" for social
reform. The government has the power to eliminate this problem (or so it
might have seemed prior to the failed prohibition experiment), so this is an
apt means for implementing a solution. Of course, withdrawal from the party
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is a threat that, if carried out, vitiates this option. The Cimeter may have been
better off counseling its readers to secure places in their party's hierarchy
to ensure the acceptance of their reforms.
Mobilizing for Action
The editor of The Cimeter viewed the paper as a sounding board for
generating unity for action.
The Cimeter will not be neutral, but independent. The paper will express
convictions on great moral questions that enter into politics. We shall utter
our convictions. We shall defend everything that is good and pure and oppose
everything that is bad and impure. We shall occupy no equivocal ground on
any great moral question, effecting public welfare. (3 Jan. 1884, 2)
The "we" in the above quotation could be understood to represent the
newspaper; however, in the broadest sense, it could refer to the temperance
movement on a whole. Editor Hughey wanted to provide a first class "Chris
tian family paper" (3 Jan. 1884). Hughey really was calling for the uniting of
"Christians" for the paper's sake and of course the temperance cause: "We
appeal to the Christian temperant men and women of this country to sustain
us in our work, and help us put just such a paper as proposed in every
household" (3 Jan. 1884, 2). If "Christians" could be united for the cause of
temperance, the political and governmental leaders would have to sympa
thize with the movement. This unifying of "Christians" for action repre
sented the possibility of a strong political coalition.
Perhaps the most significant uniting, organizing, and arousal for action was
within the different temperance groups, i.e.. Good Templars, Christian Tem
perance Union, Women's Christian Temperance Union, junior Templars,
and Neighborhood lodges. These varied organizations gave opportunity for
everyone to participate, from a small cellular structure to state and national
organization. The Cimeter devoted a page for the purpose of listing the
activities of St. Louis temperance organizations (3 Jan. 1884, 5). The printing
of these activities would hopefully create the public image of action for the
organizations and the temperance cause.
The Cimeter attempted to unite and organize "Christians" into the tem
perance cause. The possible emergence of a strong political coalition was
the shared vision. Clearly, the publication of temperance organizations' ac
tivities gave a public image of action for the cause. These efforts contributed
to the mobilization for action.
Sustaining the Movement
Another function of The Cimeter was sustaining the temperance move
ment. The membership had to remain committed to the cause. The Cimeter
attempted to reinforce the membership's commitment while providing rea
sons for the membership to feel gratified in what they were doing for tem
perance. The mandate for The Cimeter was to keep temperance people sober,
and several strategies were used to accomplish it. One such strategy was the
publication of articles by a physician who presented medical findings on the
effects of alcohol on the human body. The general theme of these articles
was clear: consumption of alcohol is bad for the human body (4 Jan. 1884).
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If one Is already a temperance member, then articles of this nature would
reinforce the temperance position.
A second strategy used stories about "Intemperance." These stories used
largely emotional appeals to reinforce the need for a life of temperance.
Examples of pathos are found in all the stories:
Friends of intemperance are the enemies of this country. Oh! Could those
fathers and mothers look into the future and see their sons, once noble and
true, now on the verge of the drunkard's grave.
Young men, did you ever stop to think how the word drunk sounded? Did
you ever think what misery and woe you bring upon your friends, when you
degrade your manhood by getting drunk?
The temptation of the social glass ... two angels sit on his shoulder, one
reminds him of mother and home while the other urges him to please his
companions, besides, what's the harmlessness of one glass.... The first glass
will start you down the road of ruin! How it crushes the heart of the poor
wife ... sitting at home, before dying embers ... listening for husband's
steps, alas, they were not. He lingers at the bar.. . starving family . . . children
suffering from the cold. (3 Jan. 1884, 2-3)
A third strategy in The Cimeter focused on the youth membership. Stories
dealt with truancy, dialogue for girls, while establishing or reinforcing an
attitude against the dreaded demon rum (3 Jan. 1884, 4). Great efforts were
taken to enlist and indoctrinate youth into the temperance movement. The
emphasis on youth was a preventative means to an end. Keep the youth
from the dreaded demon rum, and the movement will become strong. If
youth can be committed to the cause, then the future outcome might pro
duce the desired change.
The judicious use of emotional appeals has its place in committing the
readers to the movement. The constant awareness of the movement and its
activities clearly functioned to sustain the movement. Finally, the emphasis
on youth is a good strategy for ensuring the longevity of the movement.
Conclusion
The Cimeter exemplifies an important instrument of communication for a
unique social movement; the temperance newspaper. This newspaper at
tempted to transform perceptions of history by altering the past, present,
and future into Biblical terms. The temperance movement, by transforming
perceptions of society and history, established a coherent world view that
functioned to reduce temperance (a social and personal subject) into a re
ligious and moral issue. This reduction drives the specific strategies employed
by the movement. For example, the use of strong emotion in describing
conditions of alcoholics, their families, and their ruin was a definite effort
to alter society's perception of the liquor business. It is also important to
recall the self-perception of the temperance movement as a righteous move
ment. They were God's chosen for a moral cause.
Courses of action were constantly embedded in the pages of The Cimeter.
The call for people to disassociate themselves with the Republicans or Dem
ocrats must be considered significant. This represents a complete turn around
in the paper's policy. The original position of The Cimeter was that it would
not be political, nor have anything to do with party politics. Apparently,
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practical considerations forced a change in policy as the paper gave an open
endorsement of the Prohibitionist Party.
Perhaps the most obvious function of The Cimeter was its effort to sustain
members of the movement. Constant reminders of the cause were printed
on the pages. The purpose of temperance and successes of temperance
throughout the country were printed repeatedly to encourage readers to
abstain and support the cause. The Cimeter became the voice for many of
the temperance organizations in Missouri, and in this capacity it functioned
to sustain them. The printing of special notices, calls for commitment for
more involvement helped sustain these groups.
The issue of maintenance (keeping people sober) was a fundamental con
cern for The Cimeter. This temperance paper sought to explain the problems
that might be considered setbacks, justify strategies and reinforce members
of the cause. The paper attempted to provide reasons why temperance
people should be sober, strongly committed, and experience a sense of
satisfaction for their position.
This case study of The Cimeter as a part of the temperance movement also
reveals the utility of Stewart's functional approach to the rhetoric of move
ments. Rhetoric is an instrumental tool, and movements are purposeful, not
purposeless. This approach to movement criticism focuses the critic's at
tention on goals or ends a group should attempt (e.g., transforming per
ceptions, mobilizing for action) and aids the critic in uncovering and dis
playing a movement's strategic responses to these needs. Different movements
may be forced to employ different strategies for achieving their functions.
For example. The Cimeter's reliance on religious appeals could be out of
place in other movements. While the "creation-science" movement (an
oxymoron if ever there was one) could (and perhaps should) rely on religious
appeals, it would be inappropriate for the opposing movement to do so. So,
the utility of Stewart's approach is in focusing on the key functions or goals
a movement attempts to accomplish, while the strategies for implementing
those strategies should vary from movement.
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ASSESSMENT OF A RHETORICAL
TRANSFORMATION: JUDGE MILES LORD'S
COURTROOM STATEMENT TO




University of California, Davis
"You have taken the bottom line as your guiding beacon
and the low road as your route. This is corporate
irresponsibility at its meanest."
Judge Miles Lord'
The preceding remark was uttered by Judge Miles Lord in his Federal
District Courtroom on February 29,1984. It was part of a statement addressed
to three corporate officers of A. H. Robins Corporation: E. Claiborne Robins,
Jr., president and chief executive officer; Carl Lundsford, head, research and
development; William Forest, vice president and general counsel. These
individuals were present to accept an agreement between Robins and a
group of women who had brought suit against Robins. In filing the suit the
women claimed that Robins' Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine device, had
caused them unnecessary pain and physical injury. The purpose of the session
was for the representatives of Robins and the plaintiffs to accept officially
the settlement agreed upon by both parties. Thus, Lord's thirty minute
statement that largely assailed Robins' defense of the Dalkon Shield was
unexpected.
Until Miles Lord read his statement, Dalkon Shield litigation was generally
framed in institutional language of the legal system. By employing novel
metaphors, vivid symbols, and negative images, however, he framed Dalkon
Shield litigation with language of cultural significance. He argued that Robins
was more than a corporate actor involved in litigation and that Robins was
a corporate predator threatening the safety of an unknowing public. With
such framing, the product liability interpretation of the dispute became
secondary to issues of good versus evil, rich versus poor, and greed versus
decency. This transformation, although apparent throughout the statement,
is best captured in his final comment to the Robins executives, "Please in
the name of humanity lift your eye above the bottom line. You the men in
charge, must surely have hearts and souls and consciences." Thus, Judge
Lord became the rhetor to invest the Dalkon Shield dispute with cultural
' Excerpt from remarks made by Judge Miles Lord in his Federal District Courtroom,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, February 24, 1984. All subsequent quotations and phrases
found in the essay are taken from Lord's courtroom statement (extended passages are
cited specifically). See Lord.
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implications; he became Robins' denouncer and champion of society's val
ues.^
By speaking in terms of American values, Lord transformed the Dalkon
Shield case from a legal dispute into a moral imperative. In doing so, he
addressed the particularly elusive topic of corporate moral responsibility to
society as a whole. Since, according to Lord, legal sanctions against Robins
had not increased responsibility, a moral denouncement justifiably occurred.
Hence, Lord stepped out of his role as legal arbiter and condemned A. H.
Robins for moral corruption. The purpose of this essay is to examine Lord's
courtroom statement as a rhetorical transformation from legal judgment to
moral condemnation. This examination from the individual to the cultural
will demonstrate the significance of Lord's rhetorical transformation as it
pertains not only to A. H. Robins, but to the whole of corporate America.
The speech is worthy of study because it represents an uncommon if not
desperate response to a common yet perplexing problem that demands
attention: To what extent should corporations be morally responsible to
society? Before examining how Lord applies this question to Robins, a brief
background of the Dalkon Shield Affair is warranted.
Background of the Dalkon Shield
The Dalkon Shield was acquired by Robins from the Dalkon Shield Cor
poration in June 1970.^ Within two weeks after the acquisition several senior
level officials of Robins discovered the product's reported pregnancy rate
was too low and that the device's safety was questionable.* Despite this
knowledge, Robins marketed the product in January 1971. Moreover, when
the introductory campaign commenced, A. H. Robins had not conducted
clinical trials on this medical device to answer questions related to safety
issues and higher than expected pregnancy rates (Tuttle 2504).
By mid-1972, physicians and users complained to Robins about unex
pected pregnancies and medical complications linked to the Shield (Engel-
mayer and Wagman 64). These problems continued to plague the device,
and it was subsequently removed from the American market in June 1974.
Since initial litigation in 1972, Robins has elected to defend the product's
safety and efficacy.
Rhetoric of Moral Corruption
When disputed facts find their way into some institutional framework,
typically a legal or quasi-legal one, a sociolinguistic transformation occurs
' For a discussion of the challenges facing a rhetor seeking to transform an issue
from one interpretive framework to another, see Klumpp and Lukehart.
' The history of the acquisition, marketing and legal defense of the Dalkon Shield
is chronicled in three books: Engelmayer and Wagman; Perry and Dawson; Mintz.
* Remarks about the Dalkon Shield's safety and inaccurately reported pregnancy
rate circulated In a Robins' inter-office memorandum on June 11, 1970. The memo
randum was sent by William Bender, vice president, administrative staff, to executive-
level officers of Robins, including: William Zimmer, president and chief executive
officer; Charles Morton, vice-president and general manager; Roy Smith, director,
product development. See Bender.
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that is particular to the institution (Gronbeck). A medical device such as the
Dalkon Shield, for example, whose safety and efficacy is questioned may
ultimately become a "product liability" issue in the legal world. At this
institutional level, one party typically seeks to frame such an issue in insti
tutional terms favorable to his or her position while an opposing party seeks
to frame this issue in terms favorable to his or her position. This is a formal
process within an institutional framework and involves officialization of the
issue. When an issue first begins to be interpreted and acquires institutional
meanings and significations, then low level officialization occurs (Gronbeck
162-63).
If an issue is not resolved via court or out-of-court settlements, then the
issue remains in the framework and is usually considered by a different set
of actors possessing higher status. This process occurred in the Watergate
Affair; as the burglary incident moved to higher levels in the judicial system,
it was interpreted by attorneys possessing higher status and prominence
than those prosecuting and defense attorneys who participated in the initial
legal officialization of the dispute. In some cases the institutional framework
of the legal system is insufficient to resolve an issue of corruption. In situa
tions where the indicated party is perceived to have assaulted core values—
a society's reason-for-being—then cultural as well as institutional sanctions
are warranted. At the cultural level the populace becomes the offended
party.
Such was the case with A. H. Robins, and two interesting features are
worth noting since they affect the nature of the rhetoric of corporate cor
ruption with respect to Lord's statement. First, Lord's indictment of cor
porate corruption on the part of A. H. Robins came after Robins agreed to
an out of court settlement, leaving morality, not legality in question. Second,
even though the lawsuit against Robins involved payment for product liability
issues. Lord stressed the moral significance of the matter, signaling outrage
over a lack of conscience. Lord noted that Robins could not be cleansed of
this act simply by paying for damages, punitive or otherwise. The guilt, he
argued from the bench of the federal courtroom, struck a much deeper
chord regarding fundamental values of society. Thus, the context from which
he spoke provided him with a ceremonious forum to underscore and magnify
the fact that moral issues concerning core societal values were at stake.
In matters of corporate corruption, the sociolinguistic process is perhaps
the most crucial aspect in determining guilt. As opposed to political cor
ruption, where minor acts of lying and stealing may become heinous crimes
against society in certain cases, corporations resist such labels since "cor
porations" do not steal. People steal (Friedman 126-31). In embracing this
interpretation, representatives of A. H. Robins denied personal responsibility
and, therefore, resisted the sociolinguistic process in their attempts to de-
officialize the apparent corruption. Lord labels this position as a lack of
conscience while speaking to Robins' representatives:
It Is not enough to say, 'I did not know.' 'It was not me.' 'Look elsewhere.'
Time and again each of you has used this kind of argument in refusing to
acknowledge your responsibility and in pretending to the world that the
chief officers and the directors of your gigantic multinational corporation
have not responsibility for the company's acts and omissions. (72)
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To Lord the "accumulation of corporate wrongs" is a manifestation of
"individual sin," and as such, he argues that the representatives of Robins
are responsible for selling a hazardous product to the public. To right these
wrongs, an admission of guilt would be a necessary first step. However, as
Lord notes, Robins refused to do so. "In the face of overwhelming evidence,"
he states, "Robins denies its guilt and continues its monstrous mischief."
Furthermore, he points out that in light of several thousand claims settled
against Robins over the Dalkon Shield, the corporation offers no indication
of changing its "morality." On the contrary, profits continue to mount, he
notes, suggesting that Robins has not significantly suffered "any penalty
whatsoever from these litigations." In other words, legal sanctions have not
changed corrupt behavior.
The moral conflict involved in the issue before Judge Lord not only stems
from assigning individual guilt to the actions of a corporation, but also from
the corporation's commitment to the profit motive at the expense of public
safety. According to Lord, while the Dalkon Shield had damaged its corporate
credibility to some degree, Robins' success as a whole had not suffered.
Therefore, Robins has not atoned for its acts of corporate corruption. To
support this claim. Lord points to the irresponsible behavior of Robins'
officials:
The company has not suffered, nor have you men personally. You are col
lectively being enriched by millions of dollars each year. There is as yet no
evidence that your company has suffered whatsoever from these litigations.
In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. (75)
To complete the sociolinguistic process. Lord uses such terms as "instru
ments of death" and "deadly depth charge" to describe the Dalkon Shield,
creating symbolic meaning on three paradigmatic levels: facticity; institu-
tionalization; and cultural significance (Gronbeck 158-59). On the level of
facticity, these symbols directly correspond with sense experience (Gron
beck 158). From this primary level. Lord categorizes—names—the data ac
cumulated on the Dalkon Shield with terms like "death" and "deadly"
whereby the Shield becomes associated with or transformed into something
that "kills" and threatens society's ability to procreate.
At the institutional level. Lord abandons the language of the judiciary and
adopts the language of religion to add specialized meaning to the act. Cor
porate wrongs, he notes, are manifestations of individual sin. He sets the
moral tone of his statement by admitting that he engaged in "no small amount
of prayer" while contemplating the matter, and at one point he appealed
to the Robins officials by stating: "Confession is good for the soul, gentle
men." "Face up to your misdeeds and rectify this evil situation." Hence, he
affirms, by negating Robins' corrupt legal tactics, widely held beliefs asso
ciated with the proper functioning of a society. In essence. Lord contends
that Robins has displayed a fundamental disregard for society's basic need
to survive and reproduce.
With respect to Judge Lord's emphasis on religious references, the sig
nificance of Lord's rhetorical transformation bears a striking resemblance to
the biblical story of David and Goliath. While Lord played the role of David,
physically smaller and seemingly less powerful than his adversary, the cor-
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porate Goliath, he nevertheless propelled a morally charged message that
stunned his huge opponent. The outcome was not entirely the same as in
the ancient story, but the symbolism coincides. When faced with a powerful
giant that threatens public safety with selfish motives, truth and moral con
viction must come forth to protect the innocent. As in the case of David,
the incident revealed Lord's ultimate faith in the high road of morality, above
which no corporation rules. And while he did not bring Robins completely
down, public response to his statement was supportive.' A member of the
House of Representatives responded by inserting the statement into the
Congressional Record, noting it was an eloquent call for corporations to meet
their "moral as well as bottom line business obligations" (E3256-58). The
unusual courtroom remarks precipitated an increase in Dalkon Shield liti
gation as well (Walsh 1). The remarks also prompted Roger Tuttle, the first
in-house attorney to handle Dalkon litigation, to confess that he had burned
damaging documents after Robins lost its first major lawsuit in 1974 (Schwadel
3). Finally, the statement and its influence on increased litigation contributed
to Robins' decision to declare bankruptcy in 1985.'
Conclusion
When Lord completed his remarks to the Robins officials, he acknowl
edged that he had become a partisan advocate for the plaintiffs. While he
would later defend his statement as appropriate under the rubric of an
independent judiciary, he was aware that Robins would challenge the ap
propriateness of his courtroom statement. In retrospect. Miles Lord became
a committed rhetor against Robins' legal defense of the Shield. As a result
of his direct experience with its legal strategies and tactics in defense of the
intrauterine device, he became concerned that this particular corporate
defender, possessing a strong balance sheet, had an unfair advantage against
its opponents in the legal arena.
Lord's concern was reasonable and extends to other corporate actors. The
ability of many financially successful corporations to retard litigation, to delay
the judicial process in extended product liability suits, is well documented
(Moskiwitz and Ivey). This factor coupled with the fact that few, if any,
operative institutional/ceremonial places exist outside the legal arena for
corporate wrongs to be examined and purged from society, raises concern
as well. The scarcity of such "places" means that unlike political corruption,
where ceremonial frameworks are more available, corporate corruption is
likely to be considered primarily in the legal arena. Thus, the ability for this
society to purge itself of corrupt corporate predators, such as Robins, in a
"full blown degradation ceremony at the cultural level" may be remote.
The result of this situation may well produce a legal arena whereby con
frontations are unequal because corporate financial resources subvert the
legal process. This "advantage" can reduce the effectiveness of the legal
adversaries who are unable to match the financial resources of their cor-
' See, for example, "Damage Control," and "Depth Charge."
' For a discussion of how filing bankruptcy is used as a legal strategy to defend
corporations in all types of litigation, including product liability, see Moskiwitz and
Ivey.
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porate counterparts. If this situation is widespread, then the implications for
the legal system (and therefore justice) are not good. If this was the scenario
Miles Lord witnessed as a presiding judge in the Dalkon Shield litigation
before his court, and there is evidence to suggest such a scenario existed,
then his decision to ignore norms of judicial restraint and to become the
rhetor denouncing Robins' anti-social actions becomes understandable, and—
at the cultural level—warranted.
Works Cited
Bender, Ernest. "Comments Concerning the Dalkon Shield (lUD)." A. H. Robins Inter-
Office Memorandum, 11 June 1970.
Congressional Record. 24 July 1984: E3256-58.
"Damage Control at Robins." Business Week, 12 November 1984: 48.
'"Depth Charge' in the Womb." Progressive, 15 May 1984: 10.
Engelmayer, Sheldon, and Robert Wagman. Lord's Justice. Garden City, NY: Anchor
Press, 1985.
Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." In
W. Michael Hoffman and Jennifer Mills Moore (Eds.). Business Ethics. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1984, 126-31.
Gronbeck, Bruce E. "The Rhetoric of Political Corruption: Sociolinguistic, Dialectical,
and Ceremonial Processes." Quarterly Journal of Speech 64 (1978): 156-72.
Klumpp, James F., and Jeffrey Lukehart. "The Pardoning of Richard Nixon: A Failure
in Motivational Strategy." Western Journal of Speech Communication 42 (1978):
116-23.
Lord, Miles. "A Plea for Corporate Conscience." In Owen Peterson (Ed.). Representative
American Speeches: 1894-1985. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1985, 72-78.
Mintz, Morton. At Any Cost: Corporate Creed, Women, and the Dalkon Shield. New
York: Pantheon, 1985.
Moskiwitz, Daniel B., and Mark Ivey. "You Don't Have to be Broke to Need Chpt.
11." Business Week, 4 April 1987: 108.
Perry, Susan, and James Dawson. Nightmare: Women and the Dalkon Shield. New York:
Macmillan, 1985.
Schwadel, Frances. "Robins Files for Protection of Chapter 11." Wall Street Journal, 22
August 1985: 3.
Tuttle, Roger. "The Dalkon Shield Disaster Ten Years Later: A Historical Perspective."
Oklahoma Bar Journal 54 (1982): 2504.
Walsh, Mary Williams. "Legal Catalyst: Judge Miles Lord's Tactics Quicken Pace of
Litigation in Cases Involving Dalkon Shield." Wall Street Journal, 14 September
1984: 1.
40
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol26/iss1/1
RESOLVING PARADIGMATIC DISPUTES
AS A PRE-DEBATE ISSUE:
A MODEST PROPOSAL
Greg R. Miller




San Diego State University
Certainly the controversy over the appropriate paradigm for adjudicating
both policy and non-policy debate rounds has been extensive in recent
years. After all, paradigms are the lens through which critics view "reality"
in the debate round (Rowland, 1982, p. 133) and, as such, exert substantial
influence over both the debate process and individual debate outcome. The
recognition that knowledge of critics' paradigm is of paramount importance
in the audience analysis process has been instrumental in the rise of published
" judge's Philosophy" packets, as well as the frequency of formal and informal
oral interaction between participants and critics before rounds begin.
At the same time, it is clear that increasing numbers of debate critics are
willing to employ the debate round as a forum for resolving theoretic dis
putes, including paradigms (Cross and Matlon, 1978; Dempsey and Hart-
mann, 1986). A recent survey of CEDA critics (Gaske, Kugler, and Theobald,
1985) discovered that the tabula rasa paradigm was easily the most popular
critical lens. Consequently, rounds that pivot on issues such as whether the
resolution is a statement of probable truth, whether an example of the
resolution is sufficient grounds for affirming the proposition, or whether
examining policy implications is the appropriate method of evaluating a value
judgment, are becoming increasingly frequent.
To be sure, those are important matters that require resolution but wheth
er the debate round is an appropriate forum for resolving them is uncertain.
Moreover, we question the wisdom of resolving paradigmatic disputes at
the same time as other issues are decided, at the close of the debate. Rather,
we will argue that the paradigm for evaluating a particular debate round
should be decided before the round begins. Doing so, we believe, will result
in fairer, more substantive, and more productive debate. To build our case,
we will examine: 1)the role of paradigms in academic debate; 2) The problems
with resolving paradigm disputes during rounds; 3) An alternative approach;
and 4) An analysis of the possible criticisms.
The Role of Paradigms in Academic Debate
For the majority of critics, paradigmatic argumentation is acceptable. Free-
ley (1981) studied paradigms and concluded that 72% of judges feel para-
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digms are arguable In competitive debate. Similarly, Cross and Matlon (1978)
found that .. judges have shown a willingness to accept many new the
oretical arguments in debate if the theory is cogently defended by the team
presenting it" (p. 123). While some judges have inflexible paradigms, most
judges can be persuaded to analyze the debate from a number of different
models (Ulrich, 1982; Patterson and Zarefsky, 1983). Problems occur, how
ever when confusion exists about what paradigm to use.
Paradigms influence the decision of the debate itself. A judge's decisions
are often contingent on the paradigm he/she accepts in the round. After
all, changing "lenses" through which to view arguments necessarily causes
us to "see" differently. The important role of paradigms in influencing de
cisions is also manifested in the real world. Scientists decide upon the rel
evance of information based on the paradigm that is in operation. What
"counts" as meaningful data in one framework may not in another (Rowland,
1982).
Debaters are often dismayed because judges' decisions appear to be in
consistent. One of the reasons for that perceived inconsistency is the absence
of consensus on the various paradigms. Freeley (1981) argued that consensus
among the judge and debaters may anticipate what standards will be applied
in judging their effort. The lack of any clear paradigm in the round guarantees
ambiguous and inconsistent evaluation of a debate (Rowland, 1981).
In sum, debate paradigms shape the issues and decisions in a debate round.
Rowland (1982) argued;
Debate paradigms are important because they provide rules to which debaters
adapt In their quest for ballots. As long as debates prefer winning to losing,
those rules will play a major role in shaping debate practices, (p. 448)
The impact of paradigms on the issues and decisions in debate rounds is
great. The problem with the current means of resolving paradigmatic dis
putes is that they are decided at the same time as other issues. A debater
may advocate a number of positions that will be rejected because of the
model that the judge accepts. This problem could be largely avoided if
paradigms were decided before the debate begins.
Problems
One problem with arguing paradigmatic issues during a round is ambiguity.
Rowland (1982) noted that:
The function of a debate paradigm is to provide appropriate standards for
evaluating debates. If those standards are unclear or inconsistent, then neither
the judge nor the debaters involved will be certain of their applicability. The
resulting uncertainty will make the paradigm less successful in shaping debate
toward good argument. Unclear or inconsistent paradigms produce argument
that mirrors the paradigm itself—unclear and inconsistent argument, (p. 138)
This notion of paradigms mirroring arguments is not limited to unclear and
inconsistent standards, however. A clear, internally consistent paradigm will
also reflect arguments on substantive issues. We would define substantive
issues as being those arguments that are inherent to the resolution, e.g.,
establishing significance, inherency and solvency. While paradigmatic ar
gumentation would be defined as theoretical argument.
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The problem Is that If competing paradigms are defended by the two
debate teams throughout the round, It Is unclear what precepts the judge
will be adhering to In casting his or her vote. Thus, If the paradigmatic Issue
Is unresolved, what arguments are acceptable will be ambiguous. Indeed, a
judge may be persuaded to accept certain aspects of a given paradigm and
not others, making the Issue much more unclear.
A second problem with arguing paradigms during a round Is that It de
creases substantive clash. Rowland (1982) noted that: "All paradigms define
the world. They define the questions which may be asked and those that
are not worthy of consideration" (p. 138). Yet, If competing paradigms are
being argued throughout the round, then each team's substantive arguments
for or against the resolution should correspond to their own paradigms. In
other words, the questions that are "worthy of consideration" will be dif
ferent for each team. Rowland further contended that "a good paradigm
should provide a more accurate reflection of the Issues being debated than
Its competitors provide" (p. 138). Yet, when competing paradigms are de
fended In the round, there are two reflections of the Issues being debated,
one corresponding to each team's arguments.
Ulrlch (1982) noted that "A paradigm can either be Imposed upon an
Individual debate by an external agent—or the paradigm can evolve from
an Individual debate" (p. 145). To these choices we would like to add a third:
The paradigm can, and should, evolve before each Individual debate. We
adhere to the notion, as many do, that "the (debate) community should be
open to a variety of competing paradigms Instead of Imposing one paradigm
on all members of a field" (Ulrlch, 1982, p. 145). However, there Is a better
way to determine what paradigm Is most appropriate for a given round than
having the debaters argue the merits of competing paradigms during the
round, or by having the critic merely Impose one (often without the knowl
edge of the participants). By having all participants In a given round—de
baters and judges alike—come to a consensus on what paradigm to view
the debate round through before the resolution Itself Is debated, several
problems with arguing paradigms during the round could be overcome.
A Proposed Solution
A solution Is not easy to conceive, since many different factors Influence
the debate round. What we advocate Is holding a paradigmatic discussion
before the first affirmative. During this mini-debate the judge would make
a decision on the paradigm to be used In the round. The format would be
as follows:
judge discussion of paradigms— 1-3 minutes
Affirmative discussion— 1 minute
Negative discussion— 1 minute
Affirmative rebuttal— 1 minute
Negative rebuttal— 1 minute
judge's decision
We propose that the judge discuss the paradlgm(s) that he/she understands
and/or will accept, followed by a one minute affirmative discussion advo
cating one of those paradigms. If the negative agrees with the affirmative's
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paradigm then the debate can begin. If, however, the negative disagrees,
then the negative is given one minute to support another paradigm. If the
affirmative agrees, then the debate begins. If the affirmative and negative
still do not agree, they are both given one minute per team to advocate
their paradigms. At the end of this four minute mini-debate, if consensus
still does not exist, the judge weighs the various arguments and makes a
decision on the paradigm he/she will adhere to. After the judge's decision
the debate proceeds, following a short break (1 min.) for each team to assess
strategy (e.g., choice of affirmative case).
Debaters have a variety of arguments available when discussing paradigms.
For example, the affirmative could argue for adoption of a particular para
digm. Following the affirmative position, the negative could suggest that the
paradigm is internally inconsistent, promotes undesirable argumentation, is
unfair to the negative, and/or does not adequately address the central ques
tion posed by the resolution. Additionally, the negative could offer an al
ternative paradigm. Indeed, the judge would not be required to participate
in the debate, if the judge has a specific paradigm he/she advocates, the
debaters would have to support the judge's paradigm.
By utilizing this format, the role of the critic is decided at the beginning
of the round. Because paradigms influence the issues and decisions in com
petitive debate, it makes more sense to resolve paradigmatic disputes before
the issues are discussed.
The proposed solution would alleviate the problem of issue selection in
a similar way. Debaters currently advocate a number of positions that could
be rejected depending on the paradigm. If the debater were to know the
paradigm before the round, they could construct clearer strategies. The
debaters would know what arguments to initiate in constructives and extend
in the later speeches, reducing the haphazard selection of arguments.
Paradigm resolution at the beginning of the round would also increase
the familiarity and fairness of debate. First, by knowing the judge's paradigm
the debater would be able to construct positions that adhere to it. Second,
the eventual decisions would not be as difficult for debaters to understand,
since the "lens" through which the arguments were viewed would be made
explicit.
By discussing the paradigm before other issues, substantive clash during
the debate would be increased. Instead of spending an hour repeating the
reasons for various paradigms, debaters could concentrate on the substantive
issues of the resolution. Moreover, understanding the paradigm used, and
how the paradigm influences the decision-making process, would increase
clash and should enhance the depth of substantive discussion.
Finally, establishing a paradigm at the beginning of the round would make
the role of the critic clearer. It is not appropriate to decide on a paradigm
before the substantive issues surrounding the resolution are presented in
the round. For example, a judge's decision between hypothesis-testing and
policy-making would be less confusing if the critic only had to listen to the
arguments for and against each paradigm. Absent such a priori determination,
the judge may have a negative arguing qualitative policy implications that
are not absolute. At the same time, the negative argues that the judge is a
hypothesis-tester and the examples advanced increase the chance of com
mitting a hasty generalization. During all of this, the affirmative is arguing
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that such arguments undermine the goals of debate, so in an argument skills,
or communication skills paradigm the judge would still vote affirmative. At
the end of the round, the judge must weigh, or wade through, the para
digmatic arguments knowing that the decision on the paradigm will decide
the debate. This situation could be largely alleviated if the paradigm were
decided before the round began.
Criticisms
Obviously, objections exist to any proposed change. Some criticisms of
our proposal are worthy of consideration. The first criticism may be that
such a written judge's philosophy statements would cure the problem
(Dempsey and Hartmann, 1986), that altering the debate format is unnec
essary. While we agree that judges' philosophies are an excellent tool, the
format would still be desirable. Logistically, judges' philosophies are difficult
to assemble, collect, and distribute at all but the major tournaments (and
sometimes even then), judges' philosophies indicating a tabula rasa position
merely tell the debaters of increased options, not probable outcomes. And,
our experience has been that verbal engagement with critics is actually en
joyable, and enhances the debate experience.
One may suggest that the solution would reduce the use of lay judges in
debate rounds. The proposal would require the judge to begin the debate
with an understanding of at least one paradigm. The objection would be
that some judges do not understand any paradigm, so the use of lay judges
would complicate the debate.
This is interesting but ultimately the criticism is false. Lay judges could use
the opportunity to tell of their debate experience, cuing the debaters that
a long discussion of paradigms would not be beneficial. The debaters would
then understand that the debate might be judged on speaking merits. Lay
judges discussing their perspectives would accrue additional benefits to the
debater: 1) Any additional knowledge of the judge is beneficial, 2) An elab
orate strategy would be less likely to be used, making the lay judge's decision
easier, and 3) The judge would likely have a better understanding of the
debaters' arguments.
In any situation, the ultimate decision is still in the hands of the judge. If
the paradigm is decided at the beginning or at the end of the round the
judge will still have to make the decision (Ulrich, 1982). Independent of the
judge's experience in debate, his/her attitudes, beliefs and values have a
profound influence on the paradigmatic decisions.
The third criticism that could be raised is that debaters do not understand
paradigmatic issues enough to discuss them adequately beforehand. Patter
son and Zarefsky (1983) suggested that debaters must be aware of the dif
ferences among paradigms, enabling them to adjust their arguments within
the paradigms. If debaters do not understand paradigms, the mini-debate
could be a disaster. This objection loses sight of the real issue, and in fact,
it justifies our approach. Ignorance is no reason to overlook paradigms.
Familiarity with paradigms and their importance to both the debate specif
ically and the resolution generally should be increased.
The fourth criticism might be that our proposal would unnecessarily change
the format, increasing the time needed for each debate round. However,
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the extra time required for the debate would be offset by the better debating
that would occur. To spend four-seven extra minutes to listen to a discussion
of paradigms is a small price to pay. The alternative is often an hour and a
half of confusion. Preparation time could also be reduced by 1 to 2 minutes
per side without a harmful consequence. Finally, the mini-debate need not
last 4-7 minutes. Both debate teams and the judge could agree on the
paradigm at the outset of the debate.
A fifth criticism could be that our proposal would be infeasible during
elimination rounds. With the inclusion of two additional judges, the chance
of reaching a consensus, before the round, on a given paradigm would be
reduced. This argument does pose some limitations to our proposal. How
ever, paradigmatic discussion before the round begins, even in elimination
rounds, would disseminate more paradigmatic information to the debaters.
Even if there was disagreement over the paradigm to be used, the debaters
could try to adapt their arguments to each paradigm. Also, if two judges
were hypothesis-testers, and one was a communication skills critic, the de
baters would have a better understanding of how the round would be de
cided. Finally, if the tabula rasa paradigm is the most significant decision-
making model (Gaske, Kugler, and Theobald, 1985) then chances are that all
three judges would be open to paradigmatic consideration.
An additional criticism that could be voiced is the overall reduction of
paradigmatic discussion. Some debaters may have more paradigmatic issues
to discuss than is possible in the four minutes allotted. This problem is not
as significant as it might appear. Very few debaters spend more than four
minutes making new arguments regarding paradigms. More often the same
arguments are simply repeated and, given Zarefsky's (1984) earlier argument
on the nature of paradigm dispute, are simply irrelevant.
Finally, some may argue that paradigm discussions are not any different
than other issues. Why not discuss topicality before the round begins? At
first glance this criticism has merit; however, paradigms are unique in that
they influence the judge's perceptions of all issues presented. Different
paradigms create different implications for topicality, counterplans, etc.
Hence, the discussion of paradigms before the round begins is uniquely
justified.
The objections raised in this section may not be the only criticisms to our
proposal. However, we would argue that these objections are outweighed
by the advantages offered by changing paradigmatic discussion. Moreover,
even if there are logistical problems with our solution, the philosophical
underpinnings would still be intact. We need to decide paradigmatic disputes
before other substantive issues.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it must be noted that in no way do the authors see this
proposal as a "cure-all" for the problem of paradigmatic evaluation in com
petitive debate. We primarily wish to point out that, since all substantive
discussion in a debate is predicated on paradigmatic assumptions, it makes
sense to establish the paradigm before such discussion. While we believe
the proposed format to be an adequate solution to the problem, our primary
concern is the legitimacy of the philosophical underpinnings of the format.
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We have identified a number of the problems associated with discussing
paradigms while debating other issues. Hopefully, this paper will spark an
interest regarding the role of paradigms in competitive debate. The time
has come for debaters and judges to reach some agreement on paradigmatic
disputes.
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THE CROSS EXAMINATION
DEBATE ASSOCIATION:
A TIMELINE PROFILE, 1985-88
Stephen C. Wood
University of Rhode Island
The Cross Examination Debate Association has experienced significant
growth since it was founded in July 1971. it has grown from a regional
organization (Southwest Cross Examination Debate Association) (Wood and
Midgley) "to the largest collegiate debate organization in the country" (Ul-
rich). The Executive Secretary of C.E.D.A. is charged with recording and
reporting the results of tournaments and regional and national standings to
member schools. These reports can function as raw data to analyze the
direction of C.E.D.A. as a significant element in collegiate debate. The reports
from the 1984-85 season to the 1987-88 season provide useful insights into
the nature of C.E.D.A. (C.E.D.A. Executive Secretary Reports).
Specifically, the national sweepstakes point system, the trends in the fre
quency of tournaments, and a month by month analysis of C.E.D.A. com
petition are examined in this paper. Through this examination, questions
concerning elitism in the top rankings and regional domination can be ad
dressed. Obviously, this analysis is limited by the accuracy and completeness
of the C.E.D.A. reports, and this investigation has neither challenged nor
found any reason to doubt the accuracy of these reports. Selecting these
four years was arbitrary and limited by the availability of complete sets of
data. An important shift in the procedure for calculating sweepstakes points
occurred in the second year of the study. Prior to the 1985-86 year, all eight
preliminary rounds were used for point calculation, from 1985-86 to the
present the number of preliminary rounds scored was reduced to six.
C.E.D.A. Sweepstakes—How Are They Calculated?
National sweepstakes points, though somewhat controversial, are "an es
sential aspect of the work of the Cross Examination Debate Associations"
(C.E.D.A. Constitution 7). While the formula for awarding points is too long
to quote in full, a summary of the process includes the following procedures:
1. One point is awarded for each round won in prelims.
a. Two teams per school may receive points.
b. Even if there are no wins, each team receives at least one point.
c. Wins in all six preliminary rounds count or in an eight round tournament
the last six rounds count.
d. The tournament must be C.E.D.A. sanctioned.
2. One point is awarded for each ballot won in elims.
a. No more than three ballots per elim round count.
b. Even with large judging panels, any split in the ballots is treated as a
2-1 ballot.
3. Tie breaker points resolve ties in the national standings.
a. Tie breakers are calculated for the six tournaments at which a school
earned the most points.
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b. Five tie breaker points are awarded for first place, three points for a
second place, and one point for a third place.
4. Points awarded are limited to a school's six highest point winning tour
naments.
a. Low totals (IT) are informational statistics noting the fewest points earned
once a school has competed in more than six tournaments.
b. Lincoln/Douglas debate is calculated at half the points that would nor
mally be awarded to team debate. (C.E.D.A. Constitution 7-8)
The national sweepstakes points are viewed quite differently by the schools
Involved In C.E.D.A. For some, the prestige factor Is compelling, for others
the point system Is a harmless appendage that flairs up only occasionally, for
others the point system Is perceived as counter productive. Regardless of
position, the point system has been In effect long enough to assess patterns
that have emerged.
National Sweepstakes—Closed or Open?
Two factors examined In this study may shed some light on the questions
of how many national sweepstakes points It takes to earn a top ranking In
C.E.D.A. and which schools actually achieve national ranking.
Points Needed for Top C.E.D.A. Ranking
Clear patterns emerged from the 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-
88 Executive Secretary reports. The highest points won by a school (I.e., the
National Sweepstakes Champion) In each season revealed consistent level
of points needed to obtain that distinction. In 1985, UCLA won the top
honors with 180 national sweepstakes points. In 1986 and 1987, Southern
Illinois University won the top honors with 156 points each year. In 1988,
SlU challenged UCLA's high of 180 but fell two points short for a National
Sweepstakes Championship total of 178. However, the shift In the C.E.D.A.
rules after the 1984-85 season makes It more difficult for a team to achieve
such high team totals since only six preliminary rounds count, not all eight.
One way to determine how good these sweepstakes totals are Is to cal
culate the maximum possible points that could be earned In one year. If a
school had six perfect tournaments (with each tournament breaking to octo-
flnals), then 198 national sweepstakes points could be earned.^ Breaking the
198 total Is possible since some tournaments qualify for double or triple
octos,^ but clearly the range of 156 to 180 points for the National Sweepstakes
Championship reflects six exceptional tournament performances.
The National Sweepstakes Championship winner has been a fairly closed
shop for the four years studied. In fact, only six schools have won the National
Sweepstakes Championship since 1972:
^ If all six tournaments not only broke to octofinais but did so in two separate
divisions, then the total points possible could increase from 198 to 216.
^ C.E.D.A. policy governs the elimination rounds a tournament may submit for points
based on total number of teams in a division. So while it is possible to institute quarter
finals with eight teams, for C.E.D.A. points that division must have a minimum of
fifteen teams.
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TRBLE I











HIGttST POINTS TOP 50 TOP 25 TOP 10
California State University, Long Beach (72,75)
University of Arizona (73 and 74)
Brigham Young University (76, 78, '81)
California State University, Northridge ('77, '79, '80)
University of California, Los Angeles ('82, '83, '84, '85)
Southern Illinois University ('86, '87, '88)
In the last seven years, the National Sweepstakes Championship has been
won by either the University of California at Los Angeles or Southern Illinois
University. In the seventeen year history of C.E.D.A., all six National Sweep
stakes Championship winners have won that honor at least twice and typically
three times.
If we extend the analysis to include the schools reaching the top ten
C.E.D.A. national rankings, the predictability factor increases. To qualify for
the top ten, a school will have earned 119 national sweepstakes points with
at least twenty-four tie breaker points and a low point total no lower than
thirteen. The total of 119 national sweepstakes points occurred in three of
the four years studied. The only exception was 1988 when the total slipped
to 118 (less than a one percent change).
When examining the top twenty-five or even the top fifty schools, the
pattern continues. While not quite as stable as the top ten, the top twenty-
five teams ranged from ninety-six points to one hundred points over the
four years. The top fifty teams had a low of seventy-five and a high of seventy-
nine points (top fifty data was not reported in 1985). Table I illustrates the
number of national sweepstakes points needed to enter the top ranked
schools in C.E.D.A. and reflects how stable those numbers have been over
the four years studied.
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TABLE I I
FREQl£NCY OF SCHOOLS IN TOP TEN AND TOP TWENTY RANKINGS
jTOP 10
! TOP 20
OJflLIFIED 4 VRS QUflLIFlEO 3 VRS QUflLIFIED 2 VRS QUflLIFIED 1 VR
Schools Qualifying for Top Rankings
A second factor, which schools actually make it to the top C.E.D.A. rank
ings, reveals that the answer to the question "Are the top rankings a closed
or open field?" is yes and no. Table II illustrates the frequency of schools
qualifying for the top ten and top twenty national rankings. Three schools
earned top ten rankings all four years studied (University of California at Los
Angeles, Southern Illinois University and Macalester College). Four schools
earned top ten rankings in three of the four years studied (Central College,
Southwest Missouri, Florida State, and Brigham Young University). Three
schools earned top ten rankings for two of the four years (Cornell, Air Force
and Miami of Florida). Thus, ten schools earned top ten rankings more than
once in the four years studied.
Ten schools qualified once for the top ten rankings during the same four
years including Weber State, University of Tennessee, Arizona State, Whit
man College, University of Oregon, Carroll College, The College of William
and Mary, Wheaton College, Kansas State and Marist College. Only three
of the top ten rankings in the last four years were earned by schools who
were not consistently in the top twenty.
The top twenty rankings yield roughly the same overall picture as the top
ten. Five schools ranked in the top twenty in all four years, three schools
ranked in the top twenty in three of the years and nine schools ranked in
the top twenty in two of the four years studied. Twenty-four schools ap
peared in the top twenty rankings once during the four year period. So
twenty schools made it to the top twenty more than once, and twenty-four
made it only once. Thus, virtually the same ratio of new schools to schools
qualifying more than once is found in both the top ten and the top twenty
(a 1/1 ratio in the top ten, a 5/6 ratio for the top twenty which could be
expressed as a 6/6 to a 5/6 set of ratios to emphasize the similarity).
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These data are not self-evident and certainly not subject to a singular
interpretation. Cautious interpretation would suggest that there are pro
grams of C.E.D.A. debate that have achieved a level of national competitive
competency and have maintained that competency over time. Further, the
top national rankings have never been closed to "new" nationally compet
itive programs. While achieving a top ranking in C.E.D.A. is possible for
schools traditionally outside the top rankings, the national sweepstakes points
need to be competitive for these rankings seems highly predictable. The
four years selected for study suggest a plateau in terms of the numbers of
national sweepstakes points needed to be ranked in the top fifty schools in
C.E.D.A. That plateau extends to the top twenty-five, top ten and even to
the National Sweepstakes Championship schools.
Regional Bias: Myth or Reality?
C.E.D.A. began on the West coast and the leadership (the Executive Sec
retaries and Presidents) have been predominantly West coast based. The
geography of both the origin and leadership have led to unproven and
untested assumptions about "West coast domination" of C.E.D.A. Examining
the available data on a regional basis reveals an apparent lack of regional bias
in C.E.D.A.
Table III breaks down the top ten teams in C.E.D.A. sweepstakes standings
by region for the years 1985 to 1988. The data is graphed first in terms of
the number of schools from that region qualifying for a berth in the top ten
national C.E.D.A. rankings. The second and darker column represents the
"weighting factor" which is simply the number of times the same school
from that region placed in the top ten. For example, in the Southwest region
one school and one school only qualified for the top ten in the four years
studied. However, that one school qualified four times (hence, the weighting
factor of four). Whereas, in the Northwest region, three schools qualified for
the top ten over the four years but each school qualified only once during
the four years (thus, in this instance, the schools qualifying and the weighting
factor are the same).
The data in Table ill suggests that C.E.D.A. is not "West coast" dominated.
In fact, no geographic region seems to dominate the national C.E.D.A. stand
ings. The highest ranked region (Rocky Mountain) is only one to three
schools ahead of all the other regions in terms of number of schools qualifying
for the top ten. In terms of the weighting factor, the Rocky Mountain region
is one to four units above the other regions. Simple measures of central
tendency for the weighted factors across all regions reveal the balance among
regions:
MEAN for all regions = 4.9
MODE for all regions = 4.0
MEDIAN for all regions = 4.5
RANGE among regions: Low = 3, High = 7
Even collapsing the Southwest, Northwest and Rocky Mountain regions into
one "Western" unit does not support a geographic domination theory. Both
the three Central regions and the two Eastern regions qualify a proportional
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THBLE 1 1 1
C.E.D.R. TOP TEN BY REGIONfll DIVISON -- 1985-1988
Schools Oudl ifying
Ueighting Factor
S. NEST N. IfST ROCKY MTN. N. CENTRflL S. CENTRflL E. CENTRflL N. ERST S. ERST
number of teams to the top ten when compared to the three Western
regions. For the four years studied, C.E.D.A. seems free from geographic
domination.
Month By Month Analysis of Tournament
Sweepstakes Points
One measure of the health of an organization such as C.E.D.A. is the
number of tournaments available to its members and the distribution of
those tournaments during the competitive season. In any given year since
1984-85, close to 150 C.E.D.A. sanctioned tournaments were reported to
the Executive Secretary. The tournaments reported totaled 141 in 1985,154
in 1986, 147 in 1987 and 146 in 1988. This pattern suggests a robust stability
in the number of tournaments being offered in C.E.D.A. competition on a








1985 (141) 1966 (154) 1987 (147) 1988 (146)
An average of 147 Tournaments per year reported
53
et al.: Volume 26, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1988/Winter 1989/Spring 1989/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
50 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
TRBLE V




OCT NOV DEC JflN FEB MfR APR
TOTRL TOURNRMENTS 1985=141, 1986=131, 1987=131, 1988=146
Another consideration is, are the tournaments spread evenly over the
season or clustered in certain months? Table V breaks down the total number
of tournaments by month for each of the four years. (The 1987-88 figures
are included somewhat tentatively since dates for tournaments were omitted
from most of the Executive Secretary's reports and they had to be cross
referenced with the calendar.)
The data in Table V reveals that October, February, and March are the
TRBLE VI
NRTIONRL SWEEPSTAKES POINTS AWARDEDC.E.D.A
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most active months for C.E.D.A. competition (October averaged thirty-two
tournaments, February averaged twenty-eight tournaments, and March av
eraged twenty-eight tournaments). November and January averaged twenty
and nineteen tournaments respectively while December (traditionally the
end of the semester for many schools) and April (the C.E.D.A. season officially
closes early in April) have significantly lower averages.
The number of national sweepstakes points recorded by month follows a
pattern similar to the frequency of tournaments reported. Such a correlation
is expected and the only dramatic difference noted in Table VI is for the
month of April. In April 1985, 584 sweepstakes points were recorded and
this total jumped to 948 in the next year. This significant increase is explained
by the addition of the first National C.E.D.A. Tournament. In April 1987, the
number of tournaments remained fixed at two with 1,182 points reported.
In 1988, the total number of points reported for April dropped slightly to
1,026.
The pattern and distribution of tournaments speaks directly to the health
of C.E.D.A. competitive opportunities. With as many as seven or eight tour
naments being offered nation-wide on any given weekend, schools partic
ipating in C.E.D.A. have both opportunity and choice.
Conclusion
Statistics and charts do not explain the nature of C.E.D.A. competition
fully. They only begin to sketch out some of the patterns and raise some of
the questions that need to be continually raised about not only C.E.D.A. but
other forensic organizations as well. With several years of comparative sta
tistics available, the accuracy with which the national sweepstakes reflects
the goals of C.E.D.A. can be examined.
This research presents a basic analysis of issues important to many schools
participating in the Cross Examination Debate Association as well as those
interested in the integrity of debate as a co-curricular activity. While this
research covers only the last four years, it lays the groundwork for extending
the analysis to earlier years (1972-84) and continuing the analysis in the future
on a year-to-year basis.
Future research in this area can also be expanded to include factors which
may contribute to the C.E.D.A. national sweepstakes process. These factors
could include: 1) what types of tournaments are attended by the top ranked
schools, 2) what level of elimination rounds do the top ranked schools require
before attending a tournament, 3) to what extent do novice debaters effect
the national rankings and, 4) what is the impact of attendance at smaller
regional tournaments versus larger national tournaments.
Based on the four years studied, the C.E.D.A. national sweepstakes is rel
atively stable and predictable. While many schools consistently earn high
national rankings, newer programs often break into the high rank categories.
Further, the national sweepstakes process seems free from any apparent
geographical bias. This research also confirms the stable number of sanc
tioned tournaments held each year and their consistent distribution across
the debate season. FHopefully, the information found in the research raises
questions, prompts discussion and encourages additional research.
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